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Agencies’ Obligation to Interpret the 
Statute 
Aaron Saiger* 
Conventionally, when a statute delegates authority to an agency, courts 
defer to agency interpretations of that statute. Most agencies and scholars view 
such deference as a grant of permission to the agency to adopt any reasonable 
interpretation. That is wrong, jurisprudentially and ethically. An agency that 
commands deference bears a duty to adopt what it believes to be the best 
interpretation of the relevant statute. Deference assigns to the agency, rather 
than to a court, power authoritatively to declare what the law is. That power 
carries with it a duty to give the statute the best reading the agency can. 
Notwithstanding substantial jurisprudential disagreement about what 
it means to give a statute its “best interpretation,” an agency does not abide its 
role when it seeks to achieve anything less. An agency is legally and ethically 
obligated to privilege what it views as optimal statutory interpretation over 
what it considers to be optimal policy. If the two conflict, as they sometimes will, 
the agency must act consistently with the former to the detriment of the latter. 
To behave otherwise is to fail to adhere to principles of legislative supremacy 
and fidelity to law. 
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INTRODUCTION: STATING THE QUESTION 
Very often, a statute that confers power upon an agency permits 
multiple interpretations, each reasonable but mutually irreconcilable. 
How should an agency select among them? In the view of most agency 
officials and scholars, an agency is entitled, ethically and 
jurisprudentially, to pick whichever interpretation best advances its 
policy preferences, subject only to the constraint that its selection 
should survive judicial review.1 This view is as wrong as it is ubiquitous. 
In circumstances where a reviewing court is expected to defer to agency 
interpretation, the agency bears a legal and ethical duty to select the 
best interpretation of its governing statute. This is a concomitant of the 
agency’s duty, independent of the courts, to uphold the law. Best, this 
Article contends, means “best by the agency’s own criteria.” But those 
must be interpretive criteria.2 
This sharply distinguishes an agency that receives judicial 
deference from a court that extends it. Deference sometimes requires a 
court not to impose what it views as the best interpretation of a statute. 
The deferential judge sometimes must ratify and enforce statutory 
 
 1.  See infra Part II.A. 
 2.  See infra Parts I.D–E. 
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interpretations with which she disagrees.3 Such deference is especially, 
though not exclusively,4 associated with the paradigmatic case of 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.5 Absent “an 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” Chevron instructs,6 a 
reviewing court should enforce any “permissible construction” that an 
agency assigns to its statute.7 The court should not impose the 
construction that it thinks is best.8 
A responsible agency must do the opposite. It must reject 
interpretations that it concludes are interpretively suboptimal, 
notwithstanding that an ethical, law-abiding reviewing court would 
acquiesce in those interpretations. This follows directly from the 
concept of judicial deference itself. A deferential court, by abstaining 
from finally deciding what a statute means, assigns its law-declaration 
function to the agency. As Professor Henry Monaghan wrote (before 
Chevron), deference doctrine is the Marbury v. Madison of agencies.9 In 
 
 3.  Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 
(1983). This is the standard sense of the word “deference.” The primary exception is “deference” as 
used in connection with Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). So-called “Skidmore deference” is 
not deference in the sense of the term used here. See infra Part III.B. 
 4.  This Article treats Chevron as the paradigmatic deference doctrine, but its argument 
encompasses any deference rule that instructs courts to uphold or enforce an agency interpretation 
other than the one that it would adopt absent any agency interpretation. At the federal level, this 
would include, for example, foreign-affairs deference under United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), and deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own rules under 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). For an overview of the range of federal deference regimes, 
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1097–
1136 (2008). At the state level, one finds a range of deference arrangements, some as deferential 
as Chevron and others less so. See Aaron J. Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative 
Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 557–60 (2014). The argument in this Article also extends to 
proposals to extend or alter the scope of Chevron or other deference regimes. See, e.g., William N. 
Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative 
Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 446–48. 
 5.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 6.  Id. at 843. This caveat is the famous “Chevron step one.” The concept of the deference 
space suggested by Professor Strauss, described immediately infra, collapses this requirement into 
the general rubric of deference: in cases where Congress unambiguously expresses its intent, the 
set of permissible interpretations is a singleton, a set with only one member. Peter L. Strauss, 
“Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145, 1159 (2012). 
 7.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 8.  Monaghan, supra note 3, at 5; Cass Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to 
Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2588 (2006). 
 9.  Monaghan, supra note 3, at 25. 
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the mine run of cases, courts “say what the law is.”10 When such cases 
involve statutory interpretation, judicial interpretation is 
authoritative. But cases where a court defers to an agency’s statutory 
interpretation are the exception. By extending deference, a court 
renders it the “province and the duty” of the agency “to say what the law 
is.” An agency subject to deference is doing what the court would 
otherwise do. 
When a court defers, therefore, the agency’s duties parallel those 
of the judge in a case where no deference is offered. An agency obliged 
to say what the law is must do so to the best of its ability.11 Such an 
agency takes on what would have been the judicial duty to use available 
interpretive tools to reach the best account it can of what a statute 
means. An agency, like a judge, has no business assigning a second-best 
interpretation to a statute in order to achieve a preferred policy in the 
knowledge that, as a matter of institutional structure, it has the last 
word. That institutional structure, the assignment of interpretive 
finality to a particular decisionmaker, is justifiable only in light of the 
expectation that the final interpreter will interpret faithfully. 
Even as deference doctrine is the source of the agency’s duty to 
interpret, however, in American administrative law deference has 
obscured both the importance and the existence of that duty. This is 
true both in the literature and in agency practice. In large part, this is 
because courts, not agencies, decide which interpretations of a statute 
rate deference and which do not. In Professor Peter Strauss’s useful 
conceptualization, courts retain the power to set boundaries: they 
decide what a given statute “must mean and what it cannot mean,”12 
and defer only to agency interpretations that fall within the “space” 
between the two.13 Especially because the power to define a deference 
space includes the ability to collapse it to a singleton—to declare that a 
statute has only one permissible interpretation—judicial boundary-
setting has come widely to be identified with deference itself. The 
enormous and enthusiastic literature that surrounds Chevron and 
other deference doctrines undertakes to understand, justify, and 
 
 10.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803). 
 11.  See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2120, 
2144 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014), and arguing that judges 
should “determine the ‘best reading’ of a statutory text,” and depart from it only if doing so is 
justified by substantive canons of interpretation). 
 12.  Strauss, supra note 6, at 1145, 1159. 
 13.  Id.; accord Monaghan, supra note 3, at 5; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2588. 
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taxonomize judicial boundary-setting, and to analyze when and under 
what conditions courts are expansive or niggardly in defining those 
boundaries. 
The bright light that shines upon how courts limn deference 
spaces has largely eclipsed questions of how agencies operate within 
such spaces. Only recently, as administrative-law scholarship has 
begun generally to turn towards intra-agency deliberation, has a 
literature begun to develop on how agencies should interpret statutes.14 
This literature explores the argument that practices of statutory 
interpretation are properly influenced by institutional role.15 Several 
scholars have argued that an agency selecting among permissible 
interpretations should be particularly attentive to statutory purpose, 
even if, in the same case, a reviewing court might or even should 
determine the boundaries of the deference space with much greater 
attention to issues raised by the text.16 In particular, Professor Kevin 
Stack has developed the important claim that regulatory statutes are 
“purposive by statutory design,” and that agencies carrying them out 
therefore “have a statutory obligation to interpret their statutes in a 
purposive manner.”17 Textualist interpretation in the courts, 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 4; Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of 
Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 503 
(2005) (“[A]dministrative interpretation [is] a legal practice in its own right.”); Trevor W. Morrison, 
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2006) 
(“Statutory interpretation in not the exclusive province of courts; it is a core function of the 
executive branch as well.”); Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies 
Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871 (2015); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the 
Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative 
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 335 n.36 (1990). The positive analogue to these pieces is 
Professor Christopher Walker’s recent important survey of agencies. Christopher J. Walker, Inside 
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1062 (2015). Walker assesses agencies’ 
familiarity with the canons of statutory construction and their openness to the use of legislative 
history in statutory interpretation not only to aid the Congress and the courts in developing 
expectations regarding how agencies will work with statutes, but also as a way to shed light upon 
the interpretive fidelity of agencies as they construe legislation. See id. 
 15.  See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 4; Stack, supra note 14, at 875 & nn.7–10 (reviewing 
literature). This claim is an aspect of what Professors Nestor Davidson and Ethan Leib have 
usefully dubbed “regleprudence”: law adoption and law interpretation in agencies both is and 
ought to be a particular endeavor with particular rules and standards. See Nestor M. Davidson & 
Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259, 264 (2015) (arguing for a 
category distinct from jurisprudence and legisprudence that addresses the development and 
interpretation of regulations). 
 16.  See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 27–28 (2014); Michael Herz, Purposivism 
and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 94–106; 
Stack, supra note 14; Strauss, supra note 14. 
 17. Stack, supra note 14, at 876, 878. 
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concomitantly, need not and should not displace purposivist 
interpretation in the agencies. 
Even that literature, however, elides the prior question of what 
ethical self-understanding an agency should have when it selects an 
interpretation from within a non-singleton deference space. That 
understanding is independent of, and prior to, statutory design; ethics 
precede the particulars of any organic statute. An agency identifies 
multiple interpretations of its governing statute all of which are 
reasonable and consistent with the statute, and all of which therefore 
should survive judicial review. Should an agency therefore be free to 
adopt any interpretation in the deference space of an ambiguous statute 
in order to advance policies it prefers? Or must a conscientious and 
ethical agency reject interpretations that it concludes are permissible 
but interpretively suboptimal, notwithstanding that an ethical, law-
abiding reviewing court will accept such interpretations? 
On this question, the literature is silent and the cases confusing. 
Chevron in particular offers support to both positions. On the one hand, 
it repeatedly characterizes an agency choosing within a deference space 
as “interpreting” or “construing” the statute, thus engaging in the same 
task as courts would when considering an ambiguous statute de novo.18 
At the same time, Chevron states that an agency that reasonably 
construes an ambiguous statute is entitled to deference if it makes a 
“reasonable policy choice.”19 The administrative action reviewed in 
Chevron itself was a reading assigned by the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency to the ambiguous word “source” in 
the Clean Air Act.20 In a famous passage, the Chevron Court concludes 
that reading was “entitled to deference” because “the Administrator’s 
interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly 
competing interests,” and his “decision involve[d] reconciling conflicting 
policies.”21 
In many cases, both approaches lead to the same result. But not 
always. When they do not, only the first position, that agencies must 
interpret the law as best they can, is consistent with their role as 
authoritative and final declarants of what the law is. Deference doctrine 
should be understood to give interpretive power to agencies faced with 
 
 18.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 & n.9 (1984). 
 19.  Id. at 845; accord id. at 865 (noting that the agency receiving deference is “reconciling 
conflicting policies” and “rely[ing] upon the incumbent administration’s view of wise policy to 
inform its judgments”). 
 20.  Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1683. 
 21.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859. 
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legislative ambiguity. It does not say that ambiguity authorizes 
agencies to chase any policy agenda they can reasonably square with 
the statute. 
Agency practices in this area cannot be easily policed; indeed, 
because the nature of agency action makes them difficult even to 
observe. But this makes it all the more important to be clear about what 
duties agencies bear when they decide how to read a statute. As with so 
many other ethical decisions, often only the agency will know if it is 
doing the right thing.22 But, also like other such decisions, this makes 
it only more important that attention be given to what the right thing 
is. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the question of 
interpretive ethics under deference. In particular, it explores the key 
distinction between interpretation and policymaking, which creates the 
possibility that an agency can think one interpretation of a statute is 
“better” while still “preferring” a different, reasonable interpretation. 
Part II presents three possible understandings of the agency duty to 
interpret under deference, and argues that agencies expecting 
deference should hew to what they understand to be the best 
interpretation of the statute. Part III discusses variations in 
circumstances that might affect the propriety of this course of conduct. 
Dean Roscoe Pound defined “discretion” as “an authority 
conferred by law to act in certain conditions or situations in accordance 
with an official’s or an official agency’s own considered judgment and 
conscience.”23 He rounds out his definition by noting that discretion “is 
an idea of morals, belonging to the twilight zone between law and 
morals.”24 Pound was speaking of judicial discretion, but agencies 
anticipating judicial deference are the assignees of that discretion; 
Pound’s definition thus applies to them with full force. If multiple 
interpretations of a statute are all reasonable but irreconcilable, it is a 
matter of “considered judgment” to decide between them. It is also a 
matter of “morals.” This Article is about those “morals.” Legislative 
supremacy and fidelity to the statute, rather than good policy, should 
be an agency’s “moral” lodestar. 
 
 22.  Cf. Strauss, supra note 14, at 321, 335 n.36 (noting the lack of “candor” and “camouflage” 
associated the ability of an agency to “dres[s] her conclusion up in the language of [legislative] 
history and what its materials command” in order to justify a pure policy preference). 
 23.  Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual 
Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1960). 
 24.  Id.  
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I. CLARIFYING THE QUESTION 
This Article asks: May agencies subject to deferential judicial 
review adopt any interpretation that they reasonably expect to survive 
such review, or are they obligated to adopt the best interpretation? In 
this Part, I discuss why I have framed this question as I have. The 
discussion also foreshadows key aspects of the answer I propose. 
A. Defining “Agency” for the Purpose of Statutory Interpretation 
A preliminary but important point is that when this Article 
argues that agencies have a duty to interpret statutes, this duty 
obligates individuals, not institutions or entities. 
In ordinary speech, even among government people and lawyers, 
an agency is not a person. It is an organization, one more or less 
complex, with a corporate identity distinct from that of the individuals 
in its employ. However, there is an important second sense in which an 
agency is the person who leads it. The Administrative Procedure Act 
defines “agency” as “an authority of the Government of the United 
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another 
agency.”25 The “authority” to bind the government does not reside in the 
organization in the abstract. Rather, it is exercised by the agency 
head.26 In the line agencies, this is a single individual: think Cabinet 
secretary, or the EPA administrator. In the independent regulatory 
boards, authority is exercised jointly by a small group of commissioners, 
few in number and voting by majority rule. 
That the agency is an organization, in the first sense, is no less 
important for being obvious. Courts, scholars, government officials, and 
lawyers are forgivably loose when they use the word “agency” in its 
 
 25.  5 U.S.C. § 551(a) (2012). 
 26.  The APA’s identification of the “agency” with its head is explicit in its provisions for 
formal agency action. At a formal hearing, the APA offers three disjunctive possibilities regarding 
who may preside at the “taking of evidence”: “the agency”; “one or more members of the body which 
comprises the agency”; or an administrative law judge. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012). Similarly, the 
general rule that agency personnel involved in adjudicating cases may not communicate with an 
agency “employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting function” 
does not apply “to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 554(d) (2012); Diana Gillis, Closing an Administrative Loophole: Ethics for the Administrative 
Judiciary, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 869 (2009); see also 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD 
MURPHY, ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 4:42 (3d ed. 2015) (“The head of the agency is generally the final 
rulemaking authority.”). 
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corporate meaning, notwithstanding the APA.27 Such usage often 
makes sense with respect to the ethics of agencies’ work as well: one can 
think profitably about the ethical duties of agencies in their corporate 
as well as their individual identities.28 
But organizational ethics and obligations are not my concern 
here. This Article uses “agency” in its strict APA meaning: to identify 
the agency head, the person with authority to bind the government. In 
this Article, an “agency” is the person who decides (or voting members 
of the board that decides) final agency actions. (I do return briefly infra 
to the question of the ethical duties of individuals who are subordinates 
of agencies.29) 
B. The Interpretive Duties of Agencies 
An agency bears two broad categories of “ethical” obligation. One 
is that government officials must advance public rather than private 
interests when at work. This is the category that comes most easily to 
mind when one thinks about “government ethics.” Various rules and 
standards seek both to ensure public-regarding behavior and to protect 
public confidence that official behavior is public-regarding. Therefore, 
for example, we have rules concerning conflicts of interest: how to 
prevent them, how to balance the costs and benefits of regulating them, 
and how their various and mutating forms can be defined and 
operationalized.30 
 
 27.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 
YALE L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011) (analyzing “how administrative law allocates power within agencies 
and how arguments from expertise, legalism, and politics apply inside agencies rather than across 
institutions”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285, 320 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell eds., 2010) (“From the perspective of the agency considered as a whole, and of individual 
agency officials, one of the benefits of investing in learning more about the connection between 
policy choices and outcomes is the ability to achieve more desirable outcomes.”). 
 28.  That this Article does not address how to design organizations to ensure and optimize 
their ethical performance is not to derogate the complexity and vitality of such undertakings. 
Indeed, such efforts have pride of place in administrative law, in the form of APA rules that require 
agencies to separate their adjudicative and prosecutorial functions with a stringency beyond that 
required by due process. See Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures 
and Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 103, 105 (2007). 
 29.  See infra Part III.C. 
 30.  John D. Feerick, Ethics, Lawyers, and the Public Sector: A Historical Overview, in 
ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 1, 3–12 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
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When it comes to the fear of self-dealing, we generally restrict 
problematic conflicts of interest to financial ones.31 Because of concern 
over private gain, we regulate (by disclosure, limitation, or prohibition) 
things as diverse as gifts, stock ownership, and outside employment by 
government employees. We likewise restrict campaign contributions 
and insist upon disclosure of certain kinds of government action, such 
as the awarding of contracts, in large part (though not entirely) to 
interfere with efforts to achieve private gain through public means. But 
conflicts of interest that are “ethnic, cultural, emotional, nostalgic, 
regional . . . or philosophical” are generally not considered to be the 
kinds of conflict that give rise to ethical problems.32 Indeed, in many 
circumstances these kinds of commitments properly drive the conduct 
of public officials.33 Legislators’ voting decisions are a paradigmatic 
example. 
This Article does not address the potential for agencies to seek 
private gain or the ways in which regulation can reduce that potential. 
Rather, it is concerned with a second category of government ethics— 
namely obligations that actors, whom we can assume are entirely 
public-oriented, have in connection with the execution of their public 
duties.34 These are obligations based upon role. They attach to agency 
heads by virtue of their particular roles in government, not as persons 
or attorneys. Avoiding self-dealing does not exhaust the ethical duties 
of an agency official. Rather, to use Professor Jerry Mashaw’s terms, 
“internal ethics . . . both motivate and restrain [agency] behavior.”35 
And Mashaw argues explicitly that ethical statutory interpretation is 
part of that internal ethics. Agencies’ interpretive processes, he says, 
are surely subject to some kind of “internal normative direction.”36 
Mashaw is right, especially when agencies exercise discretion. 
Interpretive discretion should be cabined by professional and ethical 
 
 31.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 202–09 (2012) (criminal prohibitions). 
 32.  NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
LAW (1979), quoted in Feerick, supra note 30, at 7–8. 
 33.  W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2009). 
 34.  Cf. Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 203 (2004) (considering the arguably intermediate case of agencies who act to 
advance the self-interest of the agency qua institution, but not the personal self-interest of the 
agency qua agency head). 
 35.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an 
Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 497 (2005). 
 36.  Id. at 499. 
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constraints, which limit the influence of “ethnic, cultural, emotional, 
nostalgic, regional . . . or philosophical” factors.37 
Professor Mashaw does not distinguish between “ethics” and 
“internal normative direction.” But that distinction has bite when 
discretionary interpretation is at issue. The normative literature on 
agency statutory interpretation clusters around the proposition that 
agencies should take congressional purpose into account when 
interpreting statutes, and use legislative history materials to do so.38 
Such claims appear to flow primarily from the normative debate, still 
raging, over the relative legitimacy of textualism and purposivism as 
modes of statutory interpretation in general.39 The primary context for 
that debate is statutory interpretation by judges. But, given today’s 
burgeoning appreciation for statutory interpretation outside the courts, 
agency interpretation seems a potentially enlightening addition to the 
mix.40 For some, the claim that agencies are and should be purposivists 
and legislative historians is a way of arguing that purposivism and 
historicism are legitimate and superior methods of statutory 
interpretation in general, including interpretation by judges. Other 
treatments of the issue advance the more modest claim that regardless 
whether purposivism is legitimate or superior to textualism in general, 
it is surely both legitimate and superior as an approach to 
interpretation by agencies.41 
 
 37.  NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, supra note 32, quoted in Feerick, supra note 30, at 7–8.  
 38.  See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 421, 424, 427; Herz, supra note 16, at 94, 121; Mashaw, 
supra note 14, at 513; Stack, supra note 14, at 887; Strauss, supra note 14, at 329–32. This 
literature also has a positive analogue, where the assertion is that agencies do in fact prefer to 
interpret purposively and rely upon legislative history. Professor Christopher Walker’s important 
survey data suggests that this is so with respect to legislative history. Walker, supra note 14, at 
1038. Many scholars make the same claim based upon more informal evidence, often combining it 
with normative arguments. See Mashaw, supra note 14, at 529–30 (taking a convenience sample 
of rules that refer to “statutory interpretation,” and finding more textualism than expected and 
fewer than expected references to legislative history, though the latter are present); Stack, supra 
note 14, at 896–99; Strauss, supra note 14, at 329. 
 39. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 
119 (2009); Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209, 
224 (2015) (noting “interpretive wars over the past thirty years”). 
 40.  Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
885, 886 (2003). 
 41.  Id. at 889 (“Compared to courts, agencies are likely to have a good sense of whether a 
departure from formalism will seriously damage a regulatory scheme; hence it is appropriate to 
allow agencies a higher degree of interpretive flexibility.”); Strauss, supra note 14, at 322 (“The 
burden of this paper is that the use of legislative history may have an importance in the agency 
context for maintaining law against politics, however one regards its use at the judicial level.”). 
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Either way, these are claims that, in the hands of agencies, 
interpretations that result from a purposivist framework or rely upon 
legislative history are better, in some sense, than they would be had a 
textual framework been used or legislative history been eschewed. 
Those who make this claim do differ over exactly what it means to be 
better. I consider the substance of these differences infra Part I.D. Here, 
I distinguish between the subject of these important debates, which 
concern what is the best “internal normative frame” for agency 
interpretation, and claims about agencies’ “internal ethics.” The ethical 
frame enriches the discussion by adding an important, somewhat 
different, and underappreciated dimension of what it might mean for 
an interpretation to be “better.” The ethical frame asks what is required 
of a person for us to say that he is doing his duty in his job—not that he 
is doing his job as well as he might, or that he is going about it as 
sensibly as he should, but merely he has not been derelict in discharging 
his responsibilities. 
Thinking about what is “good” or “better” interpretation as an 
ethical matter can be both less and more demanding of agencies than 
general normative claims. It seems wrong to say, if there is a debate 
between well-meaning and well-informed jurists about the relative 
desirability of purposivism and textualism as techniques of 
interpretation, that an agency is ethically obliged to pick one or the 
other. One can believe that a particular jurist is normatively wrong to 
prefer one method to the other without thinking that either is unethical 
in her role. The ethical frame is therefore more agnostic as to 
interpretive method than the broader, normative frame.42 On the other 
hand, the ethical frame is more demanding than the normative frame 
because the ethical frame addresses what agencies ought or must do. 
An agency that fails to adhere to ethical principles is not doing a proper, 
professional job. 
To be sure, normative arguments often shade into arguments 
about public ethics. Mashaw, unsurprisingly, offers the clearest 
example. As he tentatively explores normative agency statutory 
interpretation, he asks what confers “administrative legitimacy”;43 he 
asks “what norms a responsible administrator should observe when 
 
 42.  But see Richard Elkins, Interpretive Choice in Statutory Interpretation, 59 AM. J. JURIS. 
1 (2014) (describing but rejecting strong arguments against the claim that there is a single proper 
interpretive methodology). 
 43.  Mashaw, supra note 14, at 503. 
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engaging in statutory interpretation”;44 he emphasizes the notion of 
agency as “faithful agent.”45 These concerns, about what constitutes the 
best account of agencies’ role within the “the whole of the legal 
topography,”46 can be read as normative or specifically ethical. Mashaw 
either does not see a bright distinction or does not make it clear. 
Other scholars are much more explicit in being interested in the 
ethical or “moral” dimension of agencies’ work; but this work tends not 
to focus specifically upon statutory interpretation. Professors Ethan 
Leib and Stephen Galoob contrast the views of Professor Adrian 
Vermeule, who takes a consequentialist, cost-benefit approach to 
agency action, and Professor Evan Criddle, who argues says that 
administrative agencies are “public fiduciaries,” or “stewards for the 
people.”47 Criddle is arguing within an ethical frame in the sense I 
propose here. His argument is about agencies’ fiduciary duty. 
“Fiduciary relations stand or fall on the fiduciary’s commitment to 
abandon self-interest and promote her beneficiary’s welfare instead of 
her own.”48 Criddle wants agencies to see themselves, like other 
fiduciaries, “to view their role as a call to service”;49 to “manifest 
altruism (or, at very least, honesty)”;50 “to abandon self-interest and 
promote her beneficiary’s welfare instead of her own”;51 and to embrace 
a “solemn responsibility” to live up to “the extralegal aspirational norms 
that shape fiduciary behavior.”52 One might object to Criddle’s fiduciary 
theory, or to his identification of the principals in agencies’ fiduciary 
relationships (he includes statutory beneficiaries, for example, as well 
 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 505. 
 46.  Id. at 509. 
 47.  See Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1820, 1855–58 (2016) (comparing Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in 
Administrative Law), 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 482–83 (2015) (developing an instrumentalist theory 
of administrative governance), with Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative 
Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 135–36 (2006) (defending a fiduciary political theory of international 
law)). 
 48.  Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 
128 (2006).  
 49.  Id. at 133–34. 
 50.  Id. at 128. 
 51.  Id. (quoting Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV 1735, 1783 (2001)). 
 52.  Id. at 133–34. 
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as the government and the society as a whole);53 but he is clearly 
engaged in ethical analysis. 
Professor Geoffrey Miller’s early and exemplary analysis of the 
ethical duties of agency lawyers takes the same approach. Agency 
lawyers are a category distinct from agencies themselves, but Miller 
insists that agency work is constrained by ethics. The ethical frame 
applies both to the claim that Miller rejects—that agency lawyers owe 
a duty to some “transcendental ‘public interest’ ”—and the one he 
advances—that “an agency attorney acts unethically when she 
substitutes her individual moral judgment for that of a political process 
which is generally accepted as legitimate.”54 Professor W. Bradley 
Wendel makes the same sort of move with respect to government 
lawyers in general (rather than agency lawyering in particular). 
Wendel argues that the primary “theory of government lawyers’ ethics 
should be the obligation of fidelity to law enacted by tolerably fair 
procedures.”55 His averral that this is a “thin conception of the 
legitimacy of law,” relative to the claims generated by “republican, 
deliberative, or dialogic notions of law-creation,” elegantly restates the 
distinction I have offered between the normative and ethical frames in 
this area.56 
Finally, there is an unusually well-developed subject in role-
determined legal ethics that is closely analogous to agency statutory 
interpretation. It regards the species of government lawyer that 
exercises the most unconstrained discretion: prosecutors. Discretion is 
a primary category in the literature on prosecutorial ethics.57 Moreover, 
many of prosecutors’ most consequential decisions, especially those that 
occur outside of the trial context,58 are effectively immune from 
 
 53.  See id. at 121, 138–39, 151. 
 54.  Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1987); see also Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of 
Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1173–78 (2002) (contrasting an “agency loyalty” 
and “public interest” approach to agency lawyers’ ethics); infra Part III.D (discussing lawyers’ 
ethics in the context of agency statutory interpretation). 
 55.  Wendel, supra note 33, at 1337. 
 56.  Id. at 1338. 
 57.  See, e.g., Peter Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful 
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 420–25; Ellen S. 
Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1511, 1513–15 (1999); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. 
L. REV. 1521, 1523–24 (1981). 
 58.  It is common and reasonable to distinguish ethical obligations prosecutors bear with 
respect to their conduct at trial, a process governed by ethical rules applicable to all lawyers, and 
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review.59 The ethical obligations of the prosecutor in such contexts 
therefore bear an important family resemblance to those of an agency.60 
It is easy to say that neither prosecutor nor agency should act in a way 
that is private-regarding; but the interesting ethical questions are 
about which ways of being public-regarding are appropriate. Both 
prosecutor and agency, by design, will often feel pulled between various 
ways of being public-regarding when they act on behalf of the public to 
make a decision that is likely unreviewable. The question is whether 
and to what extent some of those pulls are more legitimate than others. 
As Professor Bruce Green puts it, prosecutors’ ethics are governed not 
just by relevant rules. Rather, the profession must establish “the most 
desirable ways to exercise ‘prosecutorial discretion,’ when . . . an 
exercise of discretion [is] unfair or unwise, and when the prosecutor 
engage[s] in an ‘abuse of discretion’ (albeit, one that may not be subject 
to any sanction or remedy).”61 
The ethical rules governing prosecutors answer this question in 
ways both large and small. Prosecutors, for example, are supposed to be 
nonpartisan.62 This rule may prevent self-dealing, but its primary 
purpose is to forbid public-regarding pressures that might interfere 
with impartiality or the appearance of impartiality. Similarly, 
prosecutors have an enhanced duty to act with candor at trial.63 Most 
broadly, prosecutors are required always to “seek justice” in their 
official roles.64 This directive prioritizes one sort of public-regarding 
function, ensuring justice, against other functions that are also 
 
with respect to non-trial conduct, such as investigations, pleas, and the re-opening of cases. See 
Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 607, 636–37, 
642 (1999) (the prosecutor is “a representative of, as well as a lawyer for, [the] government”). 
 59.  Vorenberg, supra note 57, at 1523–27. 
 60.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009). Barkow not only notes the considerable scope of 
prosecutorial discretion, id. at 884–86, but also relies on the analogy between prosecutorial and 
agency discretion, id. at 887–94. 
 61.  Green, supra note 58, at 619. 
 62.  Id. at 611. 
 63.  Id. at 631. 
 64.  Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65 (2011); see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C. 
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 896; K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial 
Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 285, 306–08 (2014); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial 
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 50–53 (1991). 
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legitimate and public-regarding, such as maximizing the swiftness and 
sureness of punishment in order best to deter future misconduct.65 
The ethical situation in which agencies find themselves is not 
dissimilar. When judicial deference is available, agencies, like 
prosecutors, enjoy unreviewable discretion within fairly broad 
constraints. Both agencies and prosecutors can find the identity of their 
principal hazy—is it the government, the people, or their own particular 
agency?66 Like prosecutors, therefore, agencies’ preoccupying ethical 
dilemma is how to avoid “abuse of discretion.” This concern, of course, 
is a touchstone in administrative law.67 
This is not to say that the substance of agencies’ ethical 
obligations is the same as prosecutors’. To the contrary, public ethics 
are determined by role, and the role of each is very different. It would 
be wrongheaded indeed to imagine that agencies should seek primarily 
to “do justice.” The analogy with prosecutors is meant only to capture 
the sort of ethical inquiry that this Article undertakes. 
C. The Relationship of Deference to Duty 
In other contexts, the term “scope of discretion” has been defined 
to mean “the ability to make decisions . . . without the limits of rules or 
other constraints on freedom of action, including judicial review.”68 
Under that definition, this Article concerns what it means for agencies 
to act ethically within the scope of discretion that they enjoy with 
respect to statutory interpretation. Under a standard Chevron or other 
deference framework, courts will set aside agency action outside that 
scope; the question here therefore applies only within it. 
It is useful to consider the polar cases. Agencies’ scope of 
discretion in statutory interpretation is vast in some cases and zero in 
others. It is vast in cases where there will be no judicial review of any 
 
 65.  See PETER A. JOY & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, DO NO WRONG: ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS 
AND DEFENDERS 14 (2009). 
 66.  See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963 (2009) (describing prosecutors as “agents who imperfectly serve their 
principals (the public) and other stakeholders (such as victims and defendants)”); Criddle, supra 
note 48, at 164–65 (describing agencies as “agents of the executive branch, Congress, or the people 
as a whole”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. (c) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (“No universal definition of the client of a governmental lawyer is possible. For example, it 
has been asserted that government lawyers represent the public, or the public interest.”). 
 67.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (requiring reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . an abuse of discretion”). 
 68.  Vorenberg, supra note 57, at 1523–24. 
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kind.69 Agency action is unreviewable if a statute “preclude[s] judicial 
review” or commits “agency action . . . [entirely and unreviewably] to 
agency discretion by law”;70 if no one will have standing to invoke 
judicial review;71 or if no one will be harmed in ways that will motivate 
them sufficiently to seek judicial review.72 Agencies may also avoid 
judicial review by embedding interpretations in non-final actions, in 
refusals to take action, or in specific kinds of final actions that 
particular statutes exempt from review.73 They may also avoid review 
by timing their actions strategically.74 
When there is no judicial review, the scope of agency discretion 
is at its apogee. Absent a judicial check, the agency is the sole and final 
arbiter of statutory meaning. An agency’s obligations regarding law 
interpretation in such a situation cannot be less demanding when there 
is no review as when there is deferential review. An agency that knows 
it will not face judicial review is not entitled to act ultra vires. It 
therefore must act within its best assessment of its legislatively granted 
powers. This principle has straightforward analogues for all 
constitutional and statutory interpretation outside of the courts. 
Members of Congress and the President, when their actions are 
unreviewable, must obey the Constitution and conform to the laws.75 
Agencies are no different. The obligations discussed in this Article, 
 
 69.  But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They 
Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 204 (2007) (arguing that 
“all agency statutory interpretations are subject to de novo review and potential rejection by a 
court through application of Chevron step one” (emphasis added)). 
 70.  5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012). The courts have strongly cabined this category. See Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 826 (1985) (reiterating that the “committed to agency discretion by law” 
exception applies only when “the substantive statute left the courts with no law to apply” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 71.  Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, 
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
528, 537 n.23 (2006). 
 72.  James J. Brudney, Legislation and Regulation in the Core Curriculum: A Virtue or a 
Necessity?, 65 J.L. EDUC. 3, 13–14 (2015) (most “minor” agency actions remain “unreviewed by 
courts or essentially unreviewable”); Stephenson, supra note 71, at 537 n.23; cf. David A. Strauss, 
Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 115 (1993) (same issues 
arise regarding unreviewable executive interpretation of the Constitution). 
 73.  See Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What Agencies Can 
(and Can’t) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1689–92 (2011) (giving examples). 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 219, 239 (2004) (legislature); Morrison, supra note 14, at 1223 (executive). 
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therefore, constitute a floor for agencies acting outside the shadow of 
judicial review. 
The other, more interesting circumstance is when there is 
judicial review (or a reasonable expectation thereof76), but that review 
proceeds without deference. Here the scope of discretion is effectively 
zero. Such situations are fairly common. In many states, courts review 
de novo, without deference, some or all categories of final agency 
action.77 In the federal system, review is non-deferential when agency 
action falls within various exceptions to Chevron. The statutory 
interpretation supporting the agency action might have constitutional 
ramifications78 or be of such deep “economic and political significance” 
that Chevron is set aside.79 The interpretation in question might trigger 
one or the other canon of construction whose application trumps 
Chevron deference.80 It might involve foreign affairs in a particular 
way.81 
Finally, the interpretation might be in the Mead twilight of 
actions insufficiently authoritative to merit Chevron deference.82 Final 
actions that fall outside of Chevron under Mead are a special case, 
because per Mead many of them receive Skidmore deference.83 I return 
to so-called Skidmore “deference” in Part III.B below. In this Section, 
 
 76.  An ample literature demonstrates that Chevron and its analogues are not applied 
consistently, especially at the Supreme Court level. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to 
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980–90 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the 
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 359–63 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill, 
Textualism]; Thomas Miles & Cass Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006); Cass Sunstein, Law and 
Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2092 (1990) (“If the court has a firm 
conviction that the agency interpretation violates the statute, that interpretation must fail . . . 
even if a reasonable person might accept the agency’s view.”).  
 77.  See Saiger, supra note 4, at 558.  
 78.  See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 
(2001). 
 79.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)). See generally Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding 
Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN L. REV. 19 (2010) (reviewing doctrine). 
 80.  Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988) (constitutional avoidance); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 
(1988) (canons against retroactivity); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of 
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 77 (2008). 
 81.  See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 722–
25 (2000). 
 82.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001). 
 83.  Id. at 234–35. 
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for clarity of analysis, I assume that a reviewing court that does not 
defer interprets the statute de novo. 
When there is non-deferential judicial review, agencies that 
otherwise might seek the “best” interpretation of a statute will be 
reviewed by a court doing the same thing. It might be both reasonable 
and appropriate, therefore, for an agency working in the shadow of non-
deferential review to adopt an interpretation it considers to be 
interpretively suboptimal, on the grounds that this is the interpretation 
the reviewing court will adopt. An example would be a court whose 
precedents strongly suggest, but do not demand, an interpretation with 
which an agency disagrees. An agency might ethically adopt such an 
interpretation nonetheless. After all, it is the court that will say what 
the law is; so, under typical circumstances, it is hardly useful for the 
agency to do anything other than anticipate the courts.84 On this 
dimension, the agency is in more or less the same situation as a private 
lawyer advising a client regarding a legal regime that is uncertain. The 
lawyer has professional obligations to interpret the law fairly,85 and 
may also have opinions about what the law should be understood to 
mean; but the client primarily relies upon her to determine, as best she 
can, what the law will be decided to mean. Another apt analogy is a 
lower court anticipating review by a higher court, whose account of the 
law is generally the law as it expects the higher court to understand 
it.86 
To be sure, agency decisionmaking absent deference has its own 
ethical dimension. The agency, like any lawyer, might face 
uncertainties in anticipating the court, and therefore be in a position to 
choose among multiple predictions.87 Moreover, the agency is not the 
 
 84.  Pierce, supra note 69, at 202 (noting that absent deference, an “agency has no practical 
choice but to attempt to anticipate and replicate the interpretive process a reviewing court will 
use”). 
 85.  See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1171 
(2005) (“[N]o matter how clear a rule appears to be, it will always be ambiguous enough to be 
manipulated . . . . Professionalism . . . is therefore a principle for regulating the exercise of 
interpretive judgment.”). 
 86.  See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9–22 (1994) (articulating two models of lower-
court decisionmaking, the “precedent” and “proxy” models, both of which direct lower court 
attention to higher court opinions, and the latter of which understands a lower court directly to 
anticipate how the higher court would rule in the case before it). 
 87.  An important special case of this concern is uncertainty regarding whether the courts 
will defer to the agency’s interpretation. See supra note 76. It seems straightforward that, so long 
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same as a private lawyer advising a client in the sense that the agency 
has its own duties to the public and to uphold the law. So an agency 
might feel a duty (rather than just a strategy) not merely to predict the 
outcome but to convince the reviewing, non-deferential court that the 
agency’s own reading is the best. It could do this both by building a 
strong record and then by litigating it effectively. At the extreme, one 
can imagine Saturday-Night-Massacre scenarios in which an ethical 
agency must stand up for her own statutory interpretation 
notwithstanding likely judicial reversal, just as she ought to stand up 
for her own legal opinion notwithstanding likely sacking by the 
President or reversal by a more senior executive.88 But there must be 
room for an agency, in more quotidian circumstances, ethically to 
acknowledge that when it is not the final decisionmaker and cannot 
reasonably expect to change that decisionmaker’s mind, it is reasonable 
to adopt ab initio the view that it best anticipates that final 
decisionmaker will take rather than its own preferred view.89 
What distinguishes deferential review is that it renders the 
agency’s decision both final and discretionary. Deference creates room 
for the exercise of discretion. This is evident in the peculiar 
administrative-law doctrine that an agency that adopts a permissible 
construction of an ambiguous statute, but does so in the mistaken belief 
that the construction it adopts is the only permissible construction, 
receives no deference. In Arizona v. Thompson, for example, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed a Department 
of Health and Human Services regulation that prohibited states from 
spending federal block grant monies awarded under the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”) program to pay administrative 
costs common to the TANF program, Medicaid, and Food Stamps.90 The 
Department’s rule was not entitled to Chevron deference, the court 
 
as there is a reasonable possibility of deference, agencies bear whatever enhanced ethical 
obligations are associated with deference. 
 88.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to 
Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385, 387–88 (1994). 
 89.  Cf. Morrison, supra note 14, at 1197 (making the same observation with respect to 
presidential actions subject to de novo judicial review). An intermediate case is an agency that 
identifies political or policy gains to be had from promulgating an interpretation it expects to be 
overturned by a nondeferential court, but feels no ethical or moral duty to force a confrontation. 
The arguments in this Article suggest that such behavior is not obligatory and is normatively 
appropriate when and only when the agency believes its interpretation to be the best available. 
 90.  281 F.3d 248, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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held, because the agency “did not purport to exercise discretion.”91 
Rather, the Department believed—erroneously—that its position was 
required by the statute.92 Determinations that the agency believes to be 
compelled by the statute are not entitled to discretion; unless the 
permissible construction is adopted as an exercise of discretion, the 
agency action is remanded should the court disagree.93 In the language 
of an earlier District of Columbia Circuit case, “[w]hile the Secretary 
ha[d] discretion . . . , that discretion must [have been] exercised through 
the eyes of one who realizes she possesses it.”94 
In many respects, the approach in Arizona v. Thompson and its 
sister cases seems perverse. The agency’s decision is remanded because 
the agency found it to be too obvious; had it made the same decision 
after protracted agonizing, it would have been upheld. (The Thompson 
doctrine thus encourages agencies, as a matter of practice, always to 
state formally that a statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, 
even if they doubt that alternative interpretations are viable.95) But, 
surface perversity notwithstanding, at its heart the doctrine is 
defensible. To make an interpretive choice is a fundamentally different 
thing than to do what is clearly required; courts justifiably treat these 
two processes differently. The expositors of the doctrine emphasize, 
quoting Chevron’s language, that deference is triggered only because 
the ambiguity of the statute requires the agency to “bring its experience 
and expertise to bear in light of competing interests at stake.”96 If the 
agency sees only one interpretation, if it sees no “competing interests” 
or demand for its “expertise,” those triggering conditions are absent. 
Discretion, in other words, creates particular ethical issues. The 
discretionary interpretive choice, which then resists review, involves 
enhanced ethical demands, like a decision to prosecute or accept a plea. 
 
 91.  Id. at 253. 
 92.  Id. at 253–54. 
 93.  Id. at 254; accord Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th 
Cir. 2013), as amended (July 9, 2013) (“[B]ecause the agency misapprehended the clarity of the 
statute . . . deference is not in order.”); Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans 
Affairs, 314 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“It is, of course, impermissible for the 
Department to adopt regulations in this area on the ground that particular regulations are 
required under the unambiguous language of the statutes.”). 
 94.  Transitional Hosps. Corp. of La., Inc. v. Shalala, 222 F.3d 1019, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 95.  Cf. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 715 (2007) 
(arguing that Chevron itself motivates agencies to seek interpretive ambiguity even when it is not 
clearly present). 
 96.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (quoted 
by PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 797–98 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
3-Saiger_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2016  5:43 PM 
1252 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:5:1231 
 
 
D. What Does It Mean for an Interpretation of a Statute  
to Be “Good” or the “Best”? 
Can one interpretation of a statute be “better” than another? 
Than all others? If not, it is incoherent to suggest that agencies might 
have a duty to adopt the “best” reading of a statute. 
Judicial and academic debates regarding what constitutes 
“good” statutory interpretation are stalemated. Textualists think that 
many, most, or all interpretations based on analysis of legislative 
“purpose” and/or legislative “history” are intellectually confused, 
constitutionally illegitimate, and inappropriately politicized. 
Purposivists think that textualism is crabbed, misleading, ahistorical—
and inappropriately politicized. Purposivists “look over the crowd and 
pick out their friends.”97 Textualists are too ingenuous and too 
ingenious.98 Purposivists don’t understand the nature of legislation.99 
Textualists don’t understand the nature of language.100 And so on. 
This is of course a caricature of the multifarious, nuanced, and 
necessary arguments that multiply to fill the appellate reporters, the 
law reviews, and the university press announcements. These 
arguments are serious, sophisticated, and important to agencies’ work. 
But the purposivist/textualist standoff101 means that, as a matter of 
ethics in role, it is both difficult and unproductive to suggest that 
anyone has an obligation to throw their lot in with one side or the other. 
Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia, who could not agree about 
interpretation, each upheld their respective positions ethically. This is 
so even as there is every reason to welcome present and future efforts 
by any interpretive school to convert another by force of persuasive 
argument. 
 
 97.  This observation, now a chestnut, originates with Judge Harold Leventhal. See Patricia 
M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 
IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 n.143 (1983) (citing a conversation with Judge Leventhal). It is today 
ubiquitous in the federal reporters and the literature. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 
519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Cmty. Care Found. v. Thompson, 318 F.3d 219, 
226 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 98.  Merrill, Textualism, supra note 76, at 354. 
 99.  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS § 67 (2012). 
 100.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” 
in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 (2001); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 623 (1990). 
 101.  Mashaw, supra note 14, at 510 (“Textualists are at war with purposivists; plain language 
advocates joust with those prepared to seek meaning in legislative history.”). 
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This might be a reasonable position to take with respect to 
judicial interpretation but not with respect to agency interpretation. 
The literature has coalesced around the view that agencies not only are 
but also should be purposivist interpreters of their statutes, even if 
courts are not.102 The positive claim is that agencies, in order to 
understand their governing statute, routinely very heavily depend upon 
legislative history, communication with the Congress, and other 
indicators of legislative purpose.103 Agencies’ reliance upon the 
Congress for their ability to carry out their agendas creates a “profound” 
and “continuous incentive” for them “to act as faithful agents” of the 
legislature and “universally to honor” legislative expectations; the 
“Congress . . . is a constant and immediate presence in their 
consciousness.”104 These institutional constraints ineluctably lead them 
when interpreting statutes to serious inquiry into legislative purpose.105 
Normatively, the argument is that this is as it should be. 
Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule suggest that even if 
some form of textualism is the preferable modality of judicial statutory 
interpretation, purposive interpretation is likely to be superior for 
agencies that are technically competent, politically accountable, and 
generally trusted.106 Some, taking their cue from an early article by 
Professor Peter Strauss, argue that purposive interpretation allows 
agencies more accurately to give effect to the substantive intention of 
the Congress, and thus best to realize the uneasy but genuine place of 
agencies in the American scheme of separation of powers.107 Professor 
Jerry Mashaw recasts Strauss’s argument in more strongly normative 
terms, suggesting that Strauss “persuasively” implies that for an 
agency to ignore its own “insights into legislative purposes and 
meaning” would make it less than a “faithful agent.”108 Mashaw himself 
is less taken with legislative history than Strauss, because he 
prioritizes agency responsiveness to contemporary political 
 
 102.  See supra note 38. 
 103.  See KATZMANN, supra note 16, at 26–27. 
 104.  See Peter Strauss, Book Review, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443, 448–49 (2015) (reviewing 
ROBERT KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
 105.  Id. at 448. 
 106.  Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 40, at 928–30; accord D. Strauss, supra note 72, at 113; 
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2596–97. 
 107.  Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
549, 575 (1985); Mashaw, supra note 14, at 511; Mashaw, supra note 35, at 509; Strauss, supra 
note 14, at 347. 
 108.  Mashaw, supra note 14, at 511; accord Mashaw, supra note 35, at 509. 
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authority;109 but he agrees that agencies doing their jobs well will 
interpret statutes differently from courts.110 
Professor Kevin Stack’s important variation on this approach is 
to argue that the Congress, by passing regulatory statutes, “impose[s] 
a duty on agencies to carry out those powers in accordance with the 
principles or purposes the statutes establish.”111 Agencies should 
interpret in a purposive fashion, argues Stack, because of a 
congressional directive.112 
Other arguments offer versions of normative superiority less 
grounded in the statutes themselves than Stack’s. They argue that 
purposive agency interpretation is better in the sense that it makes 
better law, that it is more responsive to circumstances and to nuance, 
that it is less likely to take off in some undesirable direction that ill-
serves the republic and its citizens.113 The Congress, had it been able to 
anticipate the circumstances, would of course never have desired bad, 
unresponsive, or undesirable law, and so again the agency is a “better” 
agent of the Congress when it interprets purposively. 
While the case for agency purposivism is sympathetic and 
strong, it still falls short of justifying purposivist interpretation as the 
“best” sort of interpretation in ethical terms. Stack, for example, argues 
that agencies should be purposivist because “Congress, in its statutory 
delegations, directs” them to do so.114 On this view, were Congress to 
pass a statute that did not contain or that contradicted this directive, 
then agencies would have no obligation to interpret purposively. 
Similarly, one can imagine that an administration with a particular 
philosophy of law and/or attitude to regulation might appoint 
textualists to agencies, just as it would to courts, in order to achieve 
narrow readings of the law and of regulatory mandates. This might be 
foolish politics and bad policy; it also might not succeed on the 
appointing administration’s own terms. But it is hardly unethical. And, 
of course, purposivism still ties the interpreter to some extent to the 
text,115 so any gulf between textualists and purposivists in an agency is 
 
 109.  Mashaw, supra note 14, at 511–14. Political pressure is discussed infra notes 145–152 
and accompanying text. 
 110.  Mashaw, supra note 14, at 522–23 & tbl.1.  
 111.  Stack, supra note 14, at 875–76. 
 112.  Id. Stack’s approach implies that whether the Congress intends agencies to interpret 
statutes purposively depends upon the structure of that statute. 
 113.  See Herz, supra note 16, at 96. 
 114.  Stack, supra note 14, at 875. 
 115.  See infra note 119. 
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a matter of degree, not of kind. Therefore: if an agency that interprets 
like Breyer would interpret a statute in one way, and one that 
interprets like Scalia in another, no ethical principle is available that 
could reasonably call one interpretation superior. Again, that is not to 
say that there are no jurisprudential (better, “regleprudential”) 
principles that could do so—but, at this writing and for the foreseeable 
future, these principles are, or at least can be, contested. 
In a different sense of the question of whether one interpretation 
can be better than another, and whether there might often be a “best” 
interpretation, the answer is obviously “yes.” “Yes” is the right answer 
from within a given sense of interpretive principles.116 No lawyer or 
academic advocates complete indeterminacy with regard to statutory 
interpretation. Given any plausible interpretive framework, some 
interpretations are better than others—at least in most cases. The goal 
of interpretation, under whatever theory, is in part to avoid interpretive 
“error.”117 
This is obvious for a Scalia-style textualist: not only are 
textualist arguments superior, for example, to those based 
illegitimately upon legislative history, but there are good textualist 
arguments and bad ones. Scalia’s most vociferous, anti-textualist 
interlocutors think similarly about their own interpretive principles. A 
purposivist interpretation can be good or not as good; one might be 
clearly better than other, probably better than a third, and in close 
contention with a fourth. 
This internal perspective is the one this Article adopts. Agencies 
can interpret statutes in good faith using a variety of methodologies. 
And the diversity of available methodologies will frequently yield 
diverse results. Agencies have no obligation to adopt the interpretation 
that Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia, or you the reader would consider the 
“best.” I argue here only for the claim that an agency must hew to the 
interpretation that the agency itself determines, in good faith, to be the 
best interpretation. 
 
 116.  See Stephenson, supra note 71, at 538 (arguing and offering an example for the claim 
that any judge’s internal perspective determines a continuum of interpretations from best to worst, 
in the view of that judge, regardless of interpretive method). This appears to be the use of the word 
“best” adopted by the Office of Legal Counsel when it purports to provide “advice based on its best 
understanding of what the law requires.” Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions, at 1 (July 16, 2010), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-
opinions.pdf. The practice of OLC is discussed additionally infra notes 154–155 and accompanying 
text. 
 117.  Mashaw, supra note 14, at 517. 
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E. Conflicts Between Interpretation and Policy Preference 
To ask whether the reading of a statute an agency considers 
“best” from its internal interpretive perspective (call it A) must be 
adopted over the reading it prefers from its internal policy perspective 
(call it B) implies that the two will be different, at least some of the 
time. This is surely the case if an agency is textualist in its approach to 
statutory interpretation; there is no reason to expect textual 
interpretation to track policy preferences. But the assumption might 
not hold if an agency interprets its statutes purposively, as nearly all 
scholars believe that nearly all agencies do and most scholars believe 
that agencies should.118 For such an agency, it might be that, as among 
potential reasonable interpretations of the statute, the “best” 
interpretation, by definition, is always precisely the one that furthers 
the policy the agency prefers. That is, it might be that A and B are 
always the same. 
Consider what it means for an agency that interprets its statute 
purposively to identify A and B. Such an agency, having limited itself 
to interpretations that are reasonable, identifies from among them 
whichever one, in its own estimation, is the best policy (B). To choose B 
is to choose the policy that will yield the best effects: it is the one that 
best fulfills the agency’s mandate and advances its goals. But in 
determining what is goal-advancing or mandate-maximizing, the 
agency, assuming that all its reasons are public-regarding, is perhaps 
doing no more and no less than interpreting the statute in light of its 
purposes. It is, after all, the statute that sets agency goals, 
operationalizes its mandate, defines the mission, and determines what 
is best. Therefore, what the agency regards as the best policy (B) will 
be, invariably, the same as what it understands to be the best 
interpretation of the statute (A). Both are the approach to the statute 
that best effectuates its purpose(s), from the agency’s internal 
perspective. 
It is no objection that an agency might sometimes prefer to do 
something that the statute fairly clearly does not allow. By hypothesis, 
our agency restricts itself only to reasonable interpretations. The 
reasonableness assumption assures that, in Professor William 
Eskridge’s important formulation, the agency will not promulgate any 
interpretation that “impose[s] on words a meaning they will not 
 
 118.  See supra notes 102–113 and accompanying text. 
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bear.”119 Both A and B are reasonable. The reasonableness assumption 
also excludes cases of what Eskridge calls “rule-of-law shirking” or 
“democratic shirking” by agencies, both of which involve deforming the 
meaning of the statute.120 Such deformations are by definition 
unreasonable, and therefore outside the deference space. 
Nor can an agency engage in what Eskridge calls “policy 
shirking,” whereby the agency “fail[s] to pursue the congressional goals 
effectively, perhaps because of interest group capture or simply because 
of lethargy and inertia.”121 Again by hypothesis, the agency determines 
its preferred policy based upon purely public-regarding criteria. 
Therefore its preference cannot depart from its internal understanding 
of its mission. 
Chevron itself can be read to anticipate precisely this kind of 
policy-driven interpretation.122 Chevron involved a decision by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regarding the meaning of the 
Clean Air Act’s category of pollutants emitted by a “major stationary 
source.” EPA chose to read the word “source” so that it could include 
multiple smokestacks within a single industrial site; the EPA 
postulated an imaginary “bubble” over the site that could merge all 
emissions from that site into one “source.” The Chevron Court says that 
the reason EPA’s reading “is entitled to deference” is that the agency’s 
view that the statutory phrase “major stationary source” was consistent 
with the bubble “represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly 
competing interests.”123 The Court refers to EPA’s conclusion as a “wise 
 
 119.  Eskridge uses this formulation repeatedly in his work. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 4, 
at 445; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
531, 532 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)). Eskridge credits the formulation to Professors Hart and 
Sacks. See 2 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1200 (tent. ed. 1958) (cited in, e.g., William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 333 
n.43 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1007, 1038 n.119 (1989)). 
 120.  Eskridge, supra note 4, at 433. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  As is well-known, Chevron assumed that purpose-oriented interpretation, 
uncontroversial in 1984, would be standard throughout the legal system. Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (interpretation under step one proceeds 
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction”). 
 123.  Id. at 865. 
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policy.”124 The Court takes up the issue of wisdom particularly in the 
peroration of the case: 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, 
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable 
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal 
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made 
by those who do.125 
These statements sound as if, once an interpretation is within the 
Chevron space of all possible reasonable interpretations, what the 
agency is doing when it chooses is simply making policy. If what 
Chevron itself is doing in step two is deferring to EPA policy, then it is 
hard to see in what way there is light between the agency’s preferred 
policy and its preferred interpretation. 
This account—that agencies are merely instantiating policy 
preferences when they pick a policy within the Chevron space—has 
been picked up by some courts and commentators. In the courts of 
appeal, the most striking instance is the position of the District of 
Columbia Circuit that agency interpretations rate deference only if that 
interpretation results from a policy judgment.126 This rule emerged 
from a case, PDK Labs, in which the Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Agency interpreted a statute in a particular way because 
he thought it was clear. The court disagreed and thought the statute 
was ambiguous, although it thought the Agency’s interpretation was a 
possible, reasonable interpretation. Nevertheless the court declined to 
defer to the agency, on the ground that the agency had “reached [its] 
conclusion without mentioning any policy considerations or other 
matters within the agency’s expertise.”127 Chevron deference, held the 
court, does not apply whenever an agency “choose[s] between competing 
meanings.” It is available only when an agency “bring[s] its experience 
and expertise to bear in light of competing interests at stake.”128 In 
other words, a court defers only if the agency chooses its most-preferred 
policy from among the alternatives that are reasonable as a matter of 
interpretation. 
Several academic commentators have taken upon an even 
stronger version of this view, arguing that agencies choosing among 
 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id. at 866. 
 126.  PDK Labs. Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 797–98 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45). 
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policy approaches within a Chevron space are only making policy, and 
are not interpreting the statute in any meaningful sense of that word. 
Responding to analyses by Professors Jerry Mashaw and Peter Strauss 
who understood (the latter especially) statutory interpretation to be the 
ubiquitous and quotidian business of agencies, their daily bread and 
butter,129 Professor Richard Pierce insisted that this was a fundamental 
category error. Agencies, once within the Chevron space, are not 
interpreting—not “explain[ing] or tell[ing] the meaning of”—statutes at 
all.130 Rather, they are making policy, an activity distinct and 
fundamentally different from interpretation.131 
Professor Elizabeth Foote extends and elaborates Pierce’s 
claims. She argues that statutory construction on the one hand and 
“carrying out” or “implementing” statutory commands on the other are 
distinct and discrete activities, and that agencies are not engaged in the 
former when they determine policy preferences.132 It is a “misnomer” to 
label policymaking as statutory construction.133 
Professors Pierce and Foote would likely approve of PDK. They 
also are aficionados of the view that Chevron step two, in which courts 
evaluate the agency’s decision for reasonableness, is coextensive with 
the judicial analysis, commonly identified with Motor Vehicles 
Manufacturers v. State Farm, whether an agency decision must be set 
aside because it is “arbitrary [or] capricious.”134 To Pierce, “[i]t seems 
 
 129.  Mashaw, supra note 14, at 513 (noting that each agency “control[s] . . . what might be 
called its ‘interpretative agenda’ . . . the Chevron doctrine recognizes a convergence of 
interpretation and policymaking”); Strauss, supra note 14, at 329 (“The organic nature of agency 
relationships with their statutes, that agencies essentially live the process of statutory 
interpretation, makes it of special importance to see how that occurs. . . . Legislative history has a 
centrality and importance for agency lawyers that might not readily be conceived by persons who 
are outside government and are accustomed to considering its relevance only to actual or 
prospective judicial resolution of discrete disputes.”); accord Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency 
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 (1990) (“Agencies 
continually interpret the statutes they administer.”); D. Strauss, supra note 72, at 113; Sunstein, 
supra note 8, at 2588 (“interpretation was the central part of [the agency’s] job”). 
 130.  Pierce, supra note 69, at 199. 
 131.  Id. at 200, 205 (stating that when agencies make policy, “they are not involved in the 
process of statutory interpretation”). 
 132.  Foote, supra note 95, at 675. 
 133.  Id. at 695. 
 134.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). The question whether Chevron step two and State 
Farm are coextensive is a persistent puzzle in administrative law. Cf. Judulang v. Holder, 565 
U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) (“[I]n this case,” Chevron step-two analysis would be “the same” as a State 
Farm analysis, “because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is 
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apparent that step two of Chevron is State Farm.”135 This is a 
“pragmatic approach,” because “[a]s applied, the two tests are 
functionally indistinguishable.”136 They are indistinguishable in the 
sense that the selection of one reasonable interpretation from a set of 
potential reasonable interpretations—which is what the Court purports 
to assure under Chevron step two—is the same as determining that a 
policy is reasonable and therefore not “arbitrary”—which is what the 
Court purports to assure in applying State Farm.137 At the point where 
an agency reaches step two, policy and what the courts call 
“interpretation” are identical. Therefore, an agency’s internally “best” 
purposive interpretation and “best” policy are always the same. 
These arguments and authorities for the identity of best 
purposive interpretation and most preferred policy ultimately fail to 
convince. As a matter of authority, the PDK rule that agencies must 
weigh competing policy considerations in order to receive deference138 
(a rule not established in all circuits) might be read to demand some 
kind of comparative policy analysis as part of the interpretive process. 
But this does not make the two processes coextensive. An agency could 
weigh policy goals in the context of purposive interpretation and still 
emerge with an interpretation that demanded a policy different from 
the one that simply maximized its policy preferences. And Chevron’s 
own emphasis upon policy determinations must be understood in light 
of its repeated characterization of an agency’s choice of approach from 
among reasonable alternatives—such as the EPA’s choice to read 
“stationary source” to embrace the bubble—as “construction” or 
“interpretation.”139 
More broadly, the reasons that Strauss and Mashaw give for 
characterizing the process by which an agency gives meaning to its 
statute as “interpretation” are good ones. They easily survive the 
objections of Pierce and Foote. Consider Chevron itself. It takes whether 
the statutory term “stationary source” can include a “bubble” over an 
 
‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’ ”) (Kagan, J., for a unanimous Court) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 135.  RICHARD PIERCE, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.6, at 172 (4th ed. 2002). 
 136.  Id. § 3.3 at 173–74. 
 137.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46. 
 138.  See supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text. 
 139.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837, 844 (1984) (two 
uses); id. at 857, 860, 862, 863 (several uses). 
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entire facility to be a question of statutory construction.140 If the answer 
is yes, there follows a policy question whether the agency wants to read 
“source” in that way. EPA did not ever claim that “source” had to be 
read to embrace a whole facility. But the interpretive question is 
jurisprudentially prior. Before EPA could choose whether to treat 
multiple smokestacks as a single source, it had to determine whether 
the best meaning of “source” was broad enough to allow it to do so. 
Professor Strauss in particular emphasizes that the prior 
analysis, of what the statute means, can sometimes be restrictive. In 
particular, legislative history materials can lead to interpretations that 
might prevent an agency from going where it otherwise might wish to 
go.141 Strauss evokes an agency attorney at work in a library of 
legislative history materials. If that attorney is “responsible,” Strauss 
says, she will “pore through those materials . . . seeking help in 
understanding and/or justification.”142 In doing so, Strauss’s 
conscientious lawyer “acquires a sense of political history and 
possibility that will both suggest and constrain.”143 Sometimes 
historical materials compel interpretive positions that an agency cannot 
then ignore if it “do[es] not wish to destroy morale or an internal sense 
of the agency’s legitimacy.”144 Legislative history has pride of place in 
the purposive toolbox, and Strauss has no doubt that its use, and 
therefore purposivist interpretation itself, can constrain as well as 
expand statutory meaning. 
Certainly, the possibility that Chevron step two and State Farm 
demand the same judicial inquiry in no way implies that an agency, 
having determined that multiple statutory readings are legitimate, can 
ignore interpretive considerations and confine itself strictly to policy 
analysis. Even if Pierce is correct that it is the same for a court to 
determine that an agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is 
reasonable qua interpretation and reasonable qua policy, an agency 
choosing the best interpretation from a set of reasonable interpretations 
 
 140.  Id. at 840; accord John Willis, The McRuer Report: Lawyers’ Values and Civil Servants’ 
Values, 18 U. TORONTO L.J. 351, 360 (1968): 
When the Labour Relations Board is applying a standard laid down by its governing act, for 
example “appropriate unit,” it is, though in form interpreting the Act and deciding a 
“question of law,” in truth devising its “unit” policy through the eyes of people who are 
familiar with labour conditions and labour understandings. 
 141.  Strauss, supra note 14, at 330–31. 
 142.  Id. at 330. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 331. 
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could be doing something distinct from choosing the most desirable 
policy from a set of reasonable policies. 
In particular, we know of one very important set of 
considerations that affect agencies’ policy preferences but, very likely, 
not their interpretations. These are what are often called “political” 
factors. Mashaw tentatively describes (but is careful to say that he does 
not endorse) purposive agency interpretation by urging his reader to 
“imagine agency statutes as works-in-progress, to be shaped and 
molded by continuous interaction among the implementing agency, the 
political branches and affected interests” in an “ongoing process of 
agency implementation.”145 And Chevron itself endorses the view that 
the politics of a sitting administration can and should influence a 
statutory interpretation: “[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, 
properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy 
to inform its judgments.”146 
That famous statement from Chevron uses the phrase “wise 
policy,” which is not quite the same as politics. Nevertheless, most 
modern scholars agree that agencies can indeed consider “political” 
factors.147 However, the agency’s nonpolitical reasons must be sufficient 
on their own to justify its decision, without regard to political factors.148 
And an administrative record cannot explicitly advert to goals unless 
those goals are among those in fact embraced by the statute.149 Agencies 
 
 145.  Mashaw, supra note 14, at 523. 
 146.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 147.  See Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 144 (2012) (“[T]he understanding of the administrative state that prompted 
courts to develop hard-look review accepts that agency decisions are political and properly so.”); 
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE 
L.J. 2, 35–39 (2009) (documenting “widespread acceptance” of the view “that many policymaking 
decisions made by agencies cannot be resolved through a myopic technocratic lens but rather are 
highly political decisions that should be made by politically accountable institutions”). But see 
Enrique Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, and Judicial Review: A Response to Professor Watts, 62 
ADMIN. L. REV. 573, 575 (2010); cf. Marcia E. Mulkey, A Crisis of Conscience and the Government 
Lawyer, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 649, 650 (2005) (“government lawyers are often 
defensive about offering policy advice,” as distinguished from legal advice). 
 148.  See Watts, supra note 147, at 35–39 (noting the “widespread acceptance” of the view “that 
many policymaking decisions made by agencies cannot be resolved through a myopic technocratic 
lens but rather are highly political decisions that should be made by politically accountable 
institutions”). 
 149.  Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating 
that an agency is free to consider non-statutory factors, but cannot “substitute new goals in place 
of the statutory objectives without explaining how these actions are consistent with her authority 
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therefore have every incentive not to document or discuss whatever 
political considerations they do take into account, and to craft records 
that plausibly defend their conclusions without reference to such 
factors.150 There is debate about whether this incentive is pernicious, 
and whether agencies should be permitted explicitly to consider and 
discuss political factors leading to their decisions.151 
Most scholars participating in this debate understand “political” 
to mean not only “non-technocratic” but “external,” coming from the 
President or the Congress. This is a somewhat narrower category than 
the notion I am defending in this Section of public-regarding policy 
preferences independent of the statute. But such reasons are surely an 
instance of such independent preferences. So, if the President urges an 
agency to adopt one interpretation rather than another because he 
hopes to benefit a particular state or region in economic distress,152 or 
if the chairman of the relevant oversight committee does so in order to 
protect an industry important to his constituency, these are reasons 
that are public-regarding but not anticipated by the statute or fairly 
embraced by any reasonable interpretation, even a purposive one, of 
that statute. If, then, Professor Kathryn Watts and others are correct 
that there is a legitimate place for politics in agency decisionmaking, 
then there are some cases where A (the agency’s “best” interpretation 
from its internal perspective) and B (the interpretation that best 
advances the agency’s policy preference) are not the same even for the 
purposively interpreting agency.153 
 
under the statute”; agency action must be “squared with the statutory objectives that Congress 
specified as the primary guidelines for administrative action in this area”).  
 150.  Watts, supra note 147, at 43 (“[P]olitical factors influencing agency decisions are kept 
out of the public’s eye and are not subject to open public scrutiny.”); accord Nina A. Mendelson, 
Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2010). 
 151.  Watts, supra note 147, at 7–8. 
 152.  Hard questions, not considered here, are whether it should count as a public-regarding 
reason if the President’s motive is not to ameliorate economic distress but to carry the hard-pressed 
region in his reelection bid, or if the committee chair is concerned with the important industry not 
because of her constituents’ jobs but in order to stay in the good graces of its lobbyists. President 
or chair would often not communicate these true motives to the agency, but agencies would just as 
often nevertheless be equipped to identify them with confidence. See Jodi L. Short, The Political 
Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1831 
& nn.111–113 (2011) (citing other scholars); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 97 cmt. f (2000) (“Courts have stressed that a lawyer representing a governmental 
client must seek to advance the public interest in the representation and not merely the partisan 
or personal interests of the government entity or officer involved . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 153.  The caveat should be noted that for the camp of administrative-law theorists known as 
“unitarians,” who believe that agencies are truly mere agents of the president, presidential 
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This conclusion is consistent with the position of the Office of 
Legal Counsel (“OLC”), an executive-branch entity which itself often 
reviews agencies’ statutory interpretations. The Office felt no need to 
take a stand regarding the relative merits of textualism, purposivism, 
or any other interpretative method in order to declare that the “OLC 
must provide advice based on its best understanding of what the law 
requires— . . . even if that appraisal will constrain the Administration’s 
or an agency’s pursuit of desired practices or policy objectives.”154 The 
role of the OLC is to provide “dispassionate legal analysis”—
notwithstanding that, as Dean Trevor Morrison points out, “as an office 
within the Executive Branch, OLC views the law through a particular 
lens, and thus . . . its best view of the law might legitimately differ on 
some issues from that of a differently situated actor.”155 Even as role 
inflects interpretation, interpretation remains distinct from policy 
preference. 
None of this implies, of course, that the agency’s preferred policy, 
determined exclusively with regard to public-seeking criteria, must 
diverge from its preferred interpretation, arrived at in a purposive 
fashion. In many cases, we should expect the two to be the same. This 
will be particularly true for regulatory statutes that have a Progressive-
era generality to them, directing agencies to act “in the public interest,” 
to set criteria in the best judgment of the agency, or some similarly 
vague mandate. It will also frequently be true for a category of statutes 
that Professor Kevin Stack identifies, those that explicitly direct 
agencies to “carry out” the statute’s purpose.156 Nor do these define the 
universe of such cases. Chevron itself is a case where A and B were 
likely the same; so is Judulang, the case in which the Court said (“in 
this case”) that Chevron’s step two and State Farm were coextensive 
inquiries.157 
 
preferences are not properly understood to be external to agency deliberation. See Christopher C. 
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1075, 1083 (1986); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2325 n.314 
(2001) (reviewing literature); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte 
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 957 (1980). A president’s policy preferences 
could, in unitarian terms, help to establish his purposive interpretation of the statute. Even for 
unitarians, however, some legitimate presidential preferences—for example, the desire to carry a 
particular state in an upcoming election—are distinct from any possible purposive analysis of 
statutory meaning. 
 154. Barron, supra note 116, at 1. 
 155. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1448, 1456, 1467 (2010). 
 156.  Stack, supra note 14, at 889 & n.73 (also giving examples of such statutes). 
 157.  See supra note 134. 
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But there will be cases in which A and B will diverge. There is 
no reason to think such cases will be rare, especially in light of Strauss’s 
analysis. It is these cases that confront agencies with an ethical 
dilemma: How to choose? 
II. THREE THEORIES (TWO OF THEM WRONG) OF  
ETHICAL AGENCY INTERPRETATION 
This Part argues that when an agency finds itself in a situation with 
the following features— 
(1) It identifies reasonable interpretations A and B. 
(2) For legitimate reasons unconnected to interpretation, it 
would prefer to act based upon B rather than A. 
(3) It concludes that A is superior to B as a matter of 
interpretation. 
(4) Because B is nevertheless a reasonable interpretation, a 
reviewing court would enforce an action predicated upon 
either A or B. 
—the agency has an ethical duty to adopt interpretation A. The 
obligation to do so follows from the agency’s role as final, authoritative 
interpreter of the statute. The role itself follows from the practice of 
judicial deference. 
This argument therefore rejects two other views: that deference 
constitutes permission given to the agency to adopt any interpretation 
it likes within the deference space, and that deference is not relevant to 
agency obligation at all. This Part first describes these two views and 
then rejects them in favor of the argument that the paramount duty of 
an agency anticipating deference is to interpret the statute. 
A. Deference as Permission 
Many agencies and commentators appear to understand 
deference as judicial permission for an agency to adopt at its pleasure 
any interpretation that the agency plausibly expects to survive 
deferential review. 
I think this view is broadly held. However, there are very few 
contexts in which it is in agencies’ interest to articulate such an 
understanding. Evidence for its prevalence (or lack thereof) is therefore 
hard to come by. There is some. In Professor Christopher Walker’s 
survey of agency rule-drafters, an enormous majority (ninety percent of 
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respondents) report “using” the Chevron doctrine in their work.158 
Walker’s survey questions, although rich on many dimensions, do not 
make clear in what sense that doctrine might be “used.”159 
Nevertheless, Walker strongly suggests the view of Chevron-as-
permission is dominant when he quotes a respondent’s comment as an 
exemplar of the “minority view”: 
I generally try to make a rule conform with a statute as much as possible. If the statute 
has gaps, I rely on my agency’s technical expertise for the best, most reasonable way to 
fill them. . . . I think of it in terms of what is practicable and honest, not what the court 
cases specifically say. 160 
This respondent, who feels an independent duty to “conform” his rule to 
the statute, represents the approach of a small minority. 
There is also some positive anecdotal evidence for the prevalence 
of the deference-as-permission view. Important and often cited is 
Professor E. Donald Elliott’s on-the-scenes account of the impact of 
Chevron at the Environmental Protection Agency.161 Elliott reports that 
prior to Chevron, the EPA Office of General Counsel supplied statutory 
interpretations that embraced a “ ‘single-meaning’ conception of 
statutes.”162 The Office conceived of the statute as a “prescriptive text 
having a single meaning, discoverable by specialized legal training and 
tools.”163 After Chevron, the Counsel’s Office switched gears, no longer 
claiming that the statute “possess[ed] a single prescriptive meaning on 
many questions.”164 Rather, Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) opinions 
began to describe 
a “policy space,” a range of permissible interpretive discretion, within which a variety of 
decisions that the agency might make would be legally defensible to varying degrees. So 
the task of OGC today is to define the boundaries of legal defensibility, and thereby to 
recognize that often there is more than one possible interpretation of the meaning of key 
statutory terms and concepts. The agency’s policy-makers, not its lawyers, should decide 
which of several different but legally defensible interpretations to adopt.165 
 
 158.  Walker, supra note 14, at 1062. 
 159.  Id. at 1073–75. This is no fault of Walker’s, whose research questions focused upon 
different issues. 
 160.  Id. at 1062. 
 161.  E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of 
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).   
 162.  Id. at 11. 
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id. at 12. 
 165.  Id. (emphasis added); accord Mashaw, supra note 14, at 532–33 & nn.71, 73. 
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Chevron, Elliott concludes, “opened up and validated a policy-making 
dialogue within agencies about what interpretation the agency should 
adopt for policy reasons, rather than what interpretation the agency 
must adopt for legal reasons.”166 As a result of Chevron, “EPA and other 
agencies are now more adventurous when interpreting and elaborating 
statutory law.”167 There is “every reason” to imagine that Chevron had 
similar impacts in other agencies, even though neither Elliott nor the 
broader literature documents such.168 
The “policy space” that Elliott describes is identical to Professor 
Strauss’s Chevron space, the range of reasonable-and-therefore-
permissible interpretations of an ambiguous statute.169 A statute, says 
Strauss, “empower[s]” agencies with “authority” to select any 
interpretation within its Chevron space.170 Elliott is saying that EPA 
felt constrained only by policy when choosing among options in the 
Chevron spaces defined by its statutes. This is exactly the approach 
advocated by Professors Pierce and Foote, whose views are described 
above.171 Pierce and Foote claim that agencies should be described 
primarily as engaged in policymaking rather than statutory 
interpretation, and in particular that agency decisions that would be 
reviewed under Chevron step two (in Strauss’s terms, a choice within a 
multivocal Chevron space) are policy choices. The characterization of 
these moves as policy decisions suggests that policy preferences are 
their sole driver. 
Professor John Willis, making a somewhat different argument 
about Canada in the late 1960s, similarly implies that agency lawyers 
should and do identify more strongly with the “social policy” of their 
particular agency and less with the “legal policy” concerns of the 
Canadian Attorney General.172 
More recently, the theory of deference as permission has been a 
barely concealed subtext of expansive approaches to executive action 
adopted by an Obama Administration frustrated by congressional 
opposition and inaction. This practice has been both justified and 
debated primarily in terms of the reach of the president’s core 
 
 166.  Elliott, supra note 161, at 12. 
 167.  Id. at 3. 
 168.  Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2599–2600. 
 169.  Strauss, supra note 6, at 1143, 1160. 
 170.  Id. at 1145. 
 171.  See supra Part I.E. 
 172.  Willis, supra note 140, at 354. 
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constitutional “executive power” and the limits of his “prosecutorial 
discretion.”173 But executive action also often involves aggressive 
statutory interpretation. In the gun control context, for example, the 
President’s frustration with congressional unwillingness to constrict 
the easy the availability of firearms led him to instruct subordinates to, 
in the words of a spokesman, “scrub existing legal authorities to see if 
there’s any additional action we can take administratively.”174 Law 
professor and blogger David Bernstein, acknowledging that Obama’s 
man probably meant to say “scour” rather than “scrub,” notes the 
statement as intended assumes a particular version of how to advise 
the President regarding executive power: not to “first decide what’s 
lawful, and then give the president his options, [but] first seeing what 
the president wants to do, and then scour[ing] legal authorities to find 
some implausible but not crazy legal hook for his actions.”175 
“Implausible but not crazy” is an imperfect but serviceable restatement 
of this version of the Chevron step-two standard. 
Finally, there is a formal literature on the practice of agency 
interpretation. The models that this literature specifies consistently 
assume that agencies maximize their preference in a policy space, 
subject only to the external constraints of judicial review.176 Professor 
Matthew Stephenson’s model of tradeoffs between formality of agency 
procedure and interpretive flexibility, for example, proceeds on the 
assumption that agencies are “interpretive instrumentalists, attaching 
no intrinsic importance to textual fidelity or analogous concerns.”177 A 
 
 173.  See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1; United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.); Robert 
J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of 
Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013). 
 174.  Jennifer Fermino & Larry McShane, Gun Control Regulations Likely a Part of President 
Obama’s New Year’s Resolutions, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 31, 2015, 8:23 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/obama-plans-announce-gun-control-regulations-2016-
article-1.2481810 [https://perma.cc/PL5Q-GHTQ] (quoting presidential spokesman Eric Shultz). 
 175.  David Bernstein, Obama: “Scrub Existing Legal Authorities” to Take Executive Action on 
Guns?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/01/01/obama-scrub-existing-legal-authorities-to-take-executive-action-on-
guns/ [https://perma.cc/2F3E-A5FD]. Bernstein’s post credits earlier coverage by blogger and 
professor Josh Blackman. 
 176.  See, e.g., Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative 
Agencies, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 95, 96 (2010) (“In the model, the agency, which maximizes some 
objective function, adopts a rule that interprets a statute . . . .”); John R. Wright, Ambiguous 
Statutes and Judicial Deference to Federal Agencies, 22 J. THEORETICAL POL. 217 (2010). Wright 
also models judicial behavior as maximizing an objective function defined over a policy space, 
Wright, supra, at 226. 
 177.  See Stephenson, supra note 71, at 536, 544. 
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given agency simply wants to “secure whatever interpretation would 
best advance its substantive policy agenda.”178 
So too, in a model developed by Professor Yehonatan Givati, 
agencies are motivated by a desire to maximize some output: an 
environmental agency looks for the interpretation that will maximize 
environmental protection, a tax agency for the interpretation that will 
maximize government revenue, and a prosecutors’ office for the one that 
will maximize the number of cases.179 Professor John Wright similarly 
models agency decisions regarding the implementation of certain 
statutes as ones where “the agency can essentially choose any rule and 
corresponding policy outcome.”180 Stephenson’s model rests upon a 
tension between a court’s desire to secure its “own view of the best 
reading of the statute” and its desire “to maximize the agency’s ability 
to advance its policy agenda.”181 He calls the former the “textual 
plausibility” of the statute, and says that when it is high relative to the 
latter, this indicates a “more aggressively textualist” court.182 On the 
other hand, Stephenson calls a court relatively more inclined to help an 
agency secure its policy goals one that shows greater “intrinsic 
deference” to the agency.183 (In other words, Stephenson models 
nontextualism as a willingness to accept less good interpretations in 
order to facilitate better policy.) It is courts that the modeling literature 
generally casts in the role of caring about legal fidelity, or the “best” 
meaning of the statute in a noninstrumental way,184 as against policy-
driven agencies. 
It is natural for modelers to think of players who maximize 
utility subject to constraint. This is their basic professional instinct. 
And of course they make no formal claim that actual institutions behave 
as abstract ones do. Policy-maximization is an assumption.185 
Stephenson even concedes that “[i]t is of course possible that some 
agency personnel, particularly agency lawyers, may feel some intrinsic 
obligation to respect the statutory text.”186 But there is an unspoken 
 
 178.  Id. at 535. 
 179.  Givati, supra note 176, at 102 & n.5. 
 180.  Wright, supra note 176, at 222.  
 181.  See Stephenson, supra note 71, at 541. 
 182.  See id. at 542. 
 183.  See id. 
 184.  Givati, supra note 176, at 96 (modeling courts as “nonstrategic” actors); Stephenson, 
supra note 71, at 535. 
 185.  Stephenson, supra note 71, at 535. 
 186.  Id. at 535 n.22. 
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claim that the modeling assumptions are at least plausible, that, in 
Givati’s words, the models can help explain “[h]ow administrative 
agencies choose their statutory interpretation.”187 The reason that these 
models are of interest (and they are) is that their assumptions enjoy 
some level of plausibility. 
That models in which agencies feel free to maximize policy 
preferences within their deference space are interesting and useful does 
not imply that agencies do not have or are not thought to have ethical 
constraints when they make their decisions. This is obvious when one 
considers models of judicial behavior that treat courts as maximizing 
their policy preferences subject to constraints.188 This in no way implies 
that judges have no ethical constraints.189 Rather, the models are 
helpful because they shed light upon a limiting case: they describe what 
judges have the power to do, and what might happen were they to 
exercise that power. That is different from saying what judges should 
or even will do. The same is true for agencies. 
To be sure, such models of judicial behavior do respond to a 
suspicion that some judges, some of the time, do maximize policy 
preferences.190 The agency models I describe here, I think, even more 
strongly reflect a parallel suspicion. The models participate in an 
assumption in our legal culture about agency freedom of action within 
the deference space. 
To know what an agency truly thinks about the ethics of 
deference, much less what agencies in general think, is often not 
possible. As I note in the Introduction, ethics are invisible. But it does 
appear that many agencies often think that it is appropriate for them 
to range freely across the deference space in order to achieve legitimate 
policy goals. 
 
 187.  See, e.g., Givati, supra note 176, at 95. 
 188.  See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judiciary and the Role of 
Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 273, 274–77 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. 
Wittman eds., 2006); McNollGast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1651, § 7.1 at 1716–18 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“Scholars 
of law and politics typically regard judicial decisions as subsequent to legislation. From this 
perspective courts are omnipotent actors, imposing any outcome they wish.”). 
 189.  See McNollGast, supra note 188, § 7.1, at 1716 (noting judicial preferences may flow from 
“normative principles of law, moral philosophy, policy preferences or ideology”). In Stephenson’s 
model of policy-driven agency interpretation, by contrast, he assumes that a reviewing “court, all 
else equal, prefers interpretations that correspond as closely as possible to its own view of the ‘best’ 
reading of the statute.” Stephenson, supra note 71, at 537. Judge Brett Kavanaugh similarly 
asserts that “judges should strive to find the best reading of the statute.” See Kavanaugh, supra 
note 11, at 2144. 
 190.  Stephenson, supra note 27, at 307–08. 
3-Saiger_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2016  5:43 PM 
2016] AGENCIES’ OBLIGATION TO INTERPRET 1271 
 
 
B. Deference as Abstention 
A better understanding of deference is that it simply does not 
speak to how agencies should select alternative readings of a statute 
from within a deference space. It surely does not imply that all 
alternatives within the space are equally valid. Rather, all that 
deference does is assign the choice of alternatives to the agency, and 
require judges not to second-guess that choice. 
This is vivid from the language and structure of the major 
deference cases. Part II of Chevron itself, in which the Court states the 
famous two-step rule in general terms, begins straightforwardly: “When 
a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions.”191 These questions 
confront the court, not the agency. Chevron describes its deferential 
“step two” in this way: “A court may not substitute its own construction 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”192 This limits the court, not the agency. 
Mead, similarly, frames its holding as defining the circumstances in 
which a “reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency’s exercise 
of its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory 
ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems 
unwise.”193 This should not be read as an invitation to agencies actually 
to be “unwise.” To tolerate failure is not to equate failure with success. 
This view is also essential to the arguments of scholars who 
advocate agency attention to statutory purpose even when courts do not 
and even perhaps should not engage in purposivist interpretation 
themselves.194 Such arguments assume that the process of 
interpretation in an agency can and ought to be distinct from whatever 
interpretive processes might be anticipated in a reviewing court. 
Deference holdings are directed to the courts. They treat 
methods of agency decisionmaking as exogenous. 
There is some positive law about agency interpretation in 
Chevron. Chevron and its sister deference cases of course rest upon the 
APA idea that reviewing courts must set aside unreasonable agency 
action.195 This imposes (really, reiterates) a reasonableness 
 
 191.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 192.  Id. at 844. 
 193.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
 194.  See supra notes 103–113 and accompanying text. 
 195.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
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requirement upon the agency. Chevron also says that “an agency to 
which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, 
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”196 This 
tells agencies that they may permit at least some kind of policy-inflected 
preferences to influence their decisions. 
But to inform judgment is not the same as to direct judgment. 
There is plenty of room to read this latter passage as approving of 
purposive interpretation that is in line with the administration’s sense 
of congressional purpose. And, obviously, the rule that no agency 
interpretation may be unreasonable does not imply that agencies may 
promulgate any reasonable interpretation. There are neither formal nor 
prudential reasons to imply from the propositions either that 
unreasonable constructions will be set aside or that reasonable ones will 
be upheld that the agency is itself entitled to promulgate any reasonable 
interpretation. 
C. The Paramount Duty of Fidelity to the Statute 
The best understanding of deference is not just that it is agnostic 
with respect to interpretation, but that it assumes that agencies have a 
duty, independent of the courts, to interpret the statute as best they 
can. A court must uphold the law, at least with respect to any matter 
that it resolves.197 Therefore, it seems that a minimal prerequisite for a 
court to defer to an interpretation promulgated by a non-judicial 
authority is that the thing being deferred to itself be an interpretation. 
The guiding intuition that underlies this view is that legal 
grants of power, and legal restrictions upon that power, must be 
understood as prior to the exercise of the power they delineate. This 
intuition is at the root of Professor Bernstein’s claim that “[o]ne would 
hope . . . that [Obama’s] legal team would first decide what’s lawful, and 
then give the president his options, rather than first seeing what the 
president wants to do, and then scour legal authorities to find some 
implausible but not crazy legal hook for his actions.”198 This same 
intuition undergirds arguments, which proceed from politics very 
 
 196.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
 197.  Unlike the political question doctrine, for example, deference does not suggest that 
challenges to agency interpretations are situations in which courts have no prerogative to say what 
the law is. 
 198.  Bernstein, supra note 175. 
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different from Bernstein’s, that agency statutory interpretation is and 
should be self-consciously purposivist.199 These accounts emphasize 
that agencies believe consideration of purpose to be the best way for 
agencies to understand the intent of Congress. Such accounts 
emphasize the agency of agencies. They subordinate agency preferences 
to the effort to identify the meaning of legislation. 
Professor Bernstein is wrong to insist that interpretation of the 
law must be first in time, temporally prior to any view about what an 
ideal policy outcome should be.200 But interpretation should be 
intellectually prior. Interpretation that is faithful to law must be a 
process distinct from an effort simply to justify, however possible, an 
already-determined desired legal outcome. To be sure, this is no easy 
task; agencies are no different than the rest of us in their ability to 
convince themselves that what they already want to do is, indeed, the 
right thing to do. But they must be on guard against such self-deception. 
Return to the image suggested by Professor Strauss, of the agency 
lawyer with a policy agenda hard at work in a library of legislative 
materials, seeking to understand whether her agenda accords with the 
purpose of the statute as those materials define it.201 To interpret a 
statute in good faith cannot be a process where one fires at a blank wall 
and then draws a target around the point of impact. 
This understanding does not view Chevron as merely a “magna 
carta of deference, mandating greater respect for administrative 
interpretations than had theretofore been the case.”202 It denies that 
Chevron, properly read, “equivocates whether the agency’s action was 
‘interpretation’ strictu sensu or the implementation of a policy 
judgment permitted by the statutory language.”203 It privileges instead 
the more particular and apt analogy that Chevron is a counter-
Marbury.204 Chevron holds, in Professor Sunstein’s words, that “[i]n the 
face of ambiguity, it is emphatically the province and duty of the 
administrative department to say what the law is.”205 
 
 199.  See supra notes 103–113 and accompanying text. 
 200.  Bernstein, supra note 175. 
 201.  Strauss, supra note 14, at 330–31. 
 202.  Merrill, Textualism, supra note 76, at 358. 
 203.  Strauss, supra note 6, at 1163. 
 204.  Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2637 (2003) 
(“Chevron . . . is routinely referred to as the ‘counter-Marbury.’ ”); Foote, supra note 95, at 724. 
 205.  Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189 (2006) (citing, for example, 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of 
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 301–03 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in 
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The view that the agency is saying what the law is necessarily 
implies that the EPA, in the run-up to Chevron, was interpreting the 
Clean Air Act and not merely “implement[ing] a policy judgment 
permitted by the statutory language.”206 The point of Chevron is not to 
free the EPA and its sister agency from overweening judicial second-
guessing, as the barons were freed from the tyranny of King John. 
Rather, it is to assign to the agency final responsibility to declare that 
a contemporary Marbury has or lacks a particular legal entitlement. 
The agency is therefore duty-bound to do so as best it can. Like a court 
interpreting a statute nondeferentially (or without the benefit of any 
agency interpretation), an agency is subject to legislative supremacy: 
its mandate is to “say what the law is, not what the law should be.”207 
It must give force to the meaning it understands the statute to have. 
This is only true, however, in situations where Sunstein’s “in the 
face of ambiguity” caveat applies.208 Only when the courts defer does 
the agency say what the law is. 
The understanding is justified even more strongly from the 
agency side. Statutes are the sine qua non—that without which there 
is nothing—for agencies. Agencies exist as pure creatures of their 
statutes.209 As Professor Miller argued in 1987, one cannot ethically 
even assist an agency in acting if it cannot claim statutory authority, 
“since without statutory authority there is . . . no bona fide claim of 
constitutional power to act.”210 Statutes are what create agencies’ 
duties.211 When agencies interpret a statute with finality, therefore, 
fidelity to statutory meaning must override policy, adherence to a 
political agenda, or considerations of the public good. Without fidelity 
to the statute, agency power is ultra vires and illegitimate. 
This approach is broadly consistent with the view of other 
scholars who have considered agencies’ duties with respect to their 
statutes in our system of agency law. Professor Stack, for example, also 
emphasizes that the “most basic feature of a regulatory statute is the 
 
the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283–84 (1986)); see also Monaghan, supra note 3, at 
5 (anticipating this issue before Chevron); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2580, 2583–84, 2588. 
 206.  Strauss, supra note 6, at 1163. 
 207.  Kavanaugh, supra note 11, at 2119, 2120. As Kavanaugh notes repeatedly, this is “not 
always easy.” Id. at 2121, 2145. 
 208.  Sunstein, supra note 205, at 189. 
 209.  Jeffrey Rosenthal, Who is the Client of the Government Lawyer?, in ETHICAL STANDARDS 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 30, at 17, 18. 
 210.  Miller, supra note 54, at 1297. 
 211.  Stack, supra note 14, at 888. 
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vesting of lawmaking and other powers in the agency. An agency 
‘literally [has] no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers 
power upon it.’ ”212 As noted, Stack goes further and claims that 
agencies under many regulatory statutes bear duties with respect to the 
particular method of interpretation.213 For reasons described above, I 
am unready to call this additional duty a matter of agency ethics in 
role.214 But Stack is right that the analysis of duty begins with the 
source of agency power. 
Professor Criddle similarly begins from the position that 
agencies’ duties flow from their authorizing statutes. “At its heart,” he 
writes, “administrative law governs the exercise of entrusted authority 
by institutions that serve as stewards for the people. The terms of an 
administrative agency’s enabling statute reflect the type and degree of 
trust that the people, through their elected representatives, have 
chosen to repose in the agency.”215 This is exactly right. But I reason 
more narrowly from this proposition than Criddle. Criddle thinks that 
this proposition creates a general duty, by which “administrative 
agencies’ fiduciary obligations do not run solely to the chief executive or 
the legislature per se, but rather to the agencies’ statutory beneficiaries, 
who are often, but not always, the sovereign people as a whole.”216 Such 
duties, in my view, must be limited by the meaning of the “terms of the 
enabling statute.” Some statutes surely permit consideration of a 
generalized public interest; but that is a particular interpretive 
conclusion about a particular statute. Such a conclusion must be 
logically and ethically prior to the acceptance of any such duty. 
When agencies are extended deference, therefore, they do not 
gain carte blanche to use interpretation as a tool to achieve desired 
ends. They must instead interpret in good faith. This is unlike the 
responsibilities, say, of a private citizen, who is entitled to pick the 
interpretation of an unclear legal requirement that she likes the best 
and act accordingly, aware that eventually some authoritative 
decisionmaker may determine the proper interpretation for itself in a 
way that then would become binding upon her and upon others. 
 
 212.  Id. (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)). 
 213.  Id. at 888–89. 
 214.  See supra Part I.B. 
 215.  Criddle, supra note 48, at 136. 
 216.  Id. at 139. 
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It is also very unlike the ethical directive to federal prosecutors 
to “do justice” when enforcing the law.217 This is because agencies are 
diametrically different than prosecutors. They have different 
institutional roles. Prosecution is an inherent and foundational part of 
the executive function, separate by its nature from the business of 
lawmaking.218 Agencies, by contrast, are entirely animated by their 
statutes.219 They should understand their duty not as seeking the 
generalized public good but as maintaining fidelity to their statutes. 
Dean John Feerick, speaking generally about public-sector 
ethics, cites the “Athenian Oath.”220 The text of this oath as it has come 
down to us refers to a duty to “revere and obey the city’s laws and do 
our best to incite to a like respect and reverence those who are prone to 
annul or set them at naught.” Feerick asserts that this “captures all the 
ideals of public office as a public trust.”221 With respect to agencies, at 
least, he is right. Respect for the law is their first duty. Policy comes 
second. 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
A. Consistency and Precedent 
When an agency construes a statute, it says what the law is. 
Agencies therefore must respect the jurisprudential (better, 
“regleprudential”) values that accompany law declaration, although 
this respect can take a different form that it does in courts.222 Among 
the most important such values are consistency, predictability, and 
respect for precedent. 
Citizens might expect two kinds of consistency from agencies 
with respect to statutory interpretation. One is intra-agency 
consistency: an agency (within a particular agency head’s term or, in 
the case of independent regulatory bodies, between each incident of 
member turnover) should perhaps use a consistent interpretive 
methodology for all of its decisions. The other is inter-agency 
 
 217.  See supra Part I.B. 
 218.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988); see also id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(stating that prosecution “[is] conducted never by the legislature, never by the courts, and always 
by the executive”). 
 219.  Whether agencies share criminal prosecutors’ ethical duty to do justice when they 
exercise their own investigative and prosecutorial functions is discussed infra Part III.D. 
 220.  Feerick, supra note 30, at 2–3. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  See Davidson & Leib, supra note 15, at 270–71; Morrison, supra note 155, at 1493–97. 
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consistency: perhaps the President should attempt to harmonize 
methods of statutory interpretation across the agencies, or at least all 
line agencies within his administration, rather than leave the 
jurisprudential theories of interpretation to the preferences of each 
individual agency. Can the same President have a textualist EPA but a 
purposivist OSHA? Or should voters be asked to decide whether they 
prefer a textualist administration or a purposivist one? (One should not 
pretend that either a shorthand label or a lengthy exposition of 
interpretive principles would find universal acquiescence throughout 
the government, resolve all questions, or induce uniformity among 
agencies.) 
These questions, especially the latter one, have important 
theoretical implications relating to lines of authority in the 
administrative state. In practice, however, they are moot. An agency or 
a president who wants to vary methods of interpretation, and has 
public-regarding reasons for doing so, is saying that she thinks that one 
method fits a given statutory problem or policy situation or regulatory 
field better than another. But this is not really switching methods. 
Rather, such an agency is consistently implementing the method of 
interpretive pragmatism. As Judge Wald has written: 
For most of our history, American judges have been pragmatists when it comes to 
interpreting statutes. They have drawn on various conventions—the plain meaning rule, 
legislative history, considerations of statutory purpose, canons of construction—“much as 
a golfer selects the proper club when he gauges the distance to the pin and the contours 
of the course.” 223 
One can therefore hardly object to interpretive pragmatism, within or 
among agencies, as inconsistent. 
This does not imply that an agency could not declare a consistent 
commitment to a particular interpretive method. Similarly, a president 
might commit to a particular method of reading statutes, say so 
publicly, and seek to induce agencies to adopt that method.224 It is 
particularly easy to imagine in our current political climate a stated 
commitment to textualism by an agency or an entire administration. 
But departures from a preferred interpretive method in a given case, 
whether a single action or a particular agency, are not problematic 
 
 223.  Wald, supra note 97, at 215–16 (1983) (quoting a conversation with Judge Leventhal); 
see also Merrill, Textualism, supra note 76, at 351. 
 224.  Whether a President could require agencies to be textualist depends on whether he 
enjoys direct authority over agency decisions; this is the subject of substantial debate. See supra 
note 153. It is clear that many scholars would argue strenuously that a President should not, for 
reasons of policy, seek such a requirement. See supra notes 111–113 and accompanying text. 
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because they are inconsistent. If such departures are problematic at all, 
it is because the relevant interpreter opposes pragmatic interpretation.  
Presidents and agencies are ethically entitled to be as pragmatic or 
dogmatic as they choose. 
Respect for precedent is a related value, especially when agency 
decisions, like courts’, are adjudicatory in nature. How are agencies’ 
duties to assign a statute its best reading affected if there is a prior, 
authoritative statement of what the statute means? 
Two situations must be distinguished. The first: An agency in 
the past interpreted the statute one way; today’s agency, were it 
deciding de novo, would not agree that this is the best interpretation. 
Should the agency discard the prior interpretation, or may it properly 
accept what it now views as second-best interpretation in order to 
conform to its own precedent? 
This scenario imagines facts similar to those presented by a 2009 
case decided by the Supreme Court, Federal Communications 
Commission v. Fox Television.225 In a series of successive decisions 
spanning decades, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
had repeatedly changed its mind regarding whether evanescent 
utterances of vulgar terms on television violated the statutory 
requirement that holders of broadcast licenses not “utter[ ] any obscene, 
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication . . . .”226 
In its most recent flip-flop, the Commission had imposed liability on 
several networks for broadcasting such “fleeting expletives.”227 Those 
penalized asked the Supreme Court to impose a more stringent variety 
of arbitrary and capricious review when an agency had reversed its own 
precedent than would have been imposed had the agency reached the 
same decision as a matter of first impression.228 But the Supreme Court 
declined to do so. The Administrative Procedure Act and the Court’s 
precedents, it said, “mak[e] no distinction . . . between initial agency 
action and subsequent agency action undoing or revising that action.”229 
Fox TV is not our case. It concerns judicial review rather than 
agency deliberation, and was framed entirely as a question of arbitrary 
and capricious review, never even mentioning Chevron deference. But 
the Fox TV scenario allows us to ask whether the FCC in 2004, if it in 
fact believed that the statutory phrase “obscene, indecent, or profane 
 
 225.  556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 226.  18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006); discussed in Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 506. 
 227.  Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 510–12. 
 228.  Id. at 514. 
 229.  Id. at 515. 
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language” was best understood to embrace fleeting expletives, would 
nevertheless have been ethically entitled, had it wished to do so, to 
adjudicate the case using prior precedent. More plausibly, perhaps, one 
might ask whether an Obama-era FCC could have left the more 
stringent fleeting expletive prohibition in place even if, had it been 
writing on a clean slate, it would have thought that the statute did not 
reach offhand, momentary profanity. 
This is a hard question because respect for precedent is a 
category of reason that is neither about statutory interpretation nor 
about policy. Rather, it is a process value. It is unhelpful, I think, to 
resolve it simply by insisting upon the formulation that statutory 
fidelity is a primary, even paramount value for agencies, and so 
precedent should fall before it. Statutory fidelity is also such a value for 
courts, yet the courts give special weight to stare decisis in statutory 
interpretation cases.230 
On the other hand, it is unsatisfying simply to import the 
judicial principle of strong statutory stare decisis into the agency 
context. There are good normative reasons to challenge the principle,231 
and good data suggesting that the principle itself is sometimes honored 
in the breach.232 Moreover, one justification for strong statutory stare 
decisis in the courts is the separation of powers: it serves to limit 
judicial policymaking in the guise of ever-shifting interpretation.233 In 
this respect, agencies are situated differently from courts. Their 
institutions are explicitly intended to make policy and to shift in their 
policy views with evolving circumstances and the political winds.234 
Ultimately, I think, agency respect for precedent must be a 
matter of degree. A precedent today’s agency thinks entirely 
wrongheaded should be rejected, but one that is just a bit off could, even 
should, ethically be tolerated. Today’s agency is also entitled to consider 
what it knows about whether yesterday’s agency behaved ethically, that 
 
 230.  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989). 
 231.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1385 
(1988). 
 232.  Id. at 1368–69; Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute 
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 182 & n.36 (1989) (collecting cases). 
 233.  Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 317, 323–27 (2005); Marshall, supra note 232, at 208–11. 
 234.  Marshall, supra note 232, at 224–25. The literature on this topic would benefit from a 
more thorough appreciation that statutory interpretation does not involve only the Congress and 
the courts, but also involves agencies, both as authoritative interpreters of statutes and as 
institutions with quasi-legislative powers. 
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is, whether it had selected what it genuinely and public-regardingly 
thought was the best interpretation. 
The other species of potentially relevant precedent is judicial. In 
the companion cases of National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. 
Brand X235 and United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,236 the 
Supreme Court considered whether agencies may promulgate 
interpretations inconsistent with constructions already blessed by an 
authoritative court. In Brand X, the Court held that agencies could do 
so, if the court had merely deferred to a reasonable agency 
interpretation under Chevron.237 But, Home Concrete reiterated 
explicitly, agencies are bound by judicial interpretations issued with the 
understanding that there was no interpretive gap that the agency had 
been delegated to fill.238 
These are Chevron issues. For our purposes, the Home Concrete 
decision is trivial: courts limn the boundaries of the Chevron space, and 
even an agency that disagrees can and should accept the judicial map, 
prospectively and certainly retrospectively.239 But the Brand X scenario 
is a puzzler: the agency thinks that the best interpretation is B, but the 
court has already deferred to a prior interpretation C. Brand X holds 
that the agency may promulgate B notwithstanding; but the ethical 
question is whether the agency must as an ethical matter in this 
circumstance promulgate B, or whether it has ethical warrant to stick 
with C even though it judges it to be interpretively inferior. 
The Brand X problem shares with its Fox TV analogue its 
jurisprudential (better, “regleprudential”) value of respect for precedent 
and its concomitant benefits: order, reliance, and respect for the law. 
Those benefits can be as compelling in the former situation as the latter. 
But the Brand X scenario differs from that of Fox TV in two relevant 
ways. First, there is a confusion of institutions. In the Fox TV scenario, 
an agency gives up what it views as the best interpretation of a statute 
in favor of an interpretation that a prior incarnation of the agency itself 
once viewed as the best. In the Brand X scenario, no agency has ever 
necessarily offered a best reading of the statute. For the agency to 
accept the judicial reading is therefore to cede agency authority to say 
what the law is to the courts. Moreover, on the Brand X facts, the court 
never says that the interpretation it confirmed was in fact the best 
 
 235.  545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 236.  132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012). 
 237.  Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982. 
 238.  Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1843. 
 239.  Accord Miller, supra note 54, at 1298. 
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interpretation; it said only that it was a permissible interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute. Therefore, no authoritative decisionmaker has 
ever identified the best interpretation. Both of these differences, it 
seems to me, make the Brand X situation less unclear than the Fox TV 
situation, and counsel in favor of an agency indeed having a duty to 
promulgate B—the interpretation that it thinks best. 
B. When Agencies Face Skidmore Deference 
In Skidmore v. Swift, a pre-Chevron case, the Supreme Court 
said that agency interpretations of a statutory term that were “not 
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority” could “still 
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”240 “The weight of such 
a judgment in a particular case,” Skidmore continued, “will depend 
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”241 
In recent times, the Supreme Court revitalized Skidmore by 
declaring, in Mead, that Skidmore is the relevant standard for 
reviewing many agency interpretations promulgated with procedures 
more informal than the notice-and-comment procedures defined by the 
Administrative Procedure Act.242 
Given that I have argued for a duty borne by agencies only when 
they are subject to judicial deference, does that duty apply to agencies 
that will receive deference under Skidmore or its analogues? That 
depends on whether Skidmore is really deference. If it is, then agencies 
retain their duty. If not, as I argue in Part I.C, they are entitled to 
ignore their own best judgment and instead anticipate the courts. 
Skidmore is certainly not deference in the way Chevron is. 
Under Chevron, agency interpretations receive deference because they 
are made by the agency. They are “controlling upon the courts by reason 
of their authority.”243 At the same time, there are other senses of the 
term “deference” under which Skidmore clearly qualifies.244 Skidmore 
 
 240.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001). 
 243.  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 244.  Monaghan, supra note 3, at 5. 
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does involve deference, for example, in the view of Professors Jonathan 
Masur and Lisa Ouellette, who recently defined deference “to include 
any situation in which a second decisionmaker is influenced by the 
judgment of some initial decisionmaker rather than examining an issue 
entirely de novo.”245 
For the purposes of the agency obligation to interpret, the 
question is whether Skidmore is the sort of deference that requires a 
court, in some situations, to endorse a statutory construction that it 
does not view as the best available.246 This is the sense of deference that 
makes the agency into an authoritative interpreter of its statute, which 
in turn is what triggers its ethical obligation to adopt the best 
interpretation it thinks will survive review.247 Absent final interpretive 
authority, the agency is entitled simply to anticipate the construction 
that it expects the reviewing court to adopt. 
But it is doubtful that Skidmore in fact involves deference in this 
sense. Mead settles only that the Court describes Skidmore review as 
“deference,”248 not whether it is deference of this sort. Given that 
Skidmore says that agencies are due its deference only to the extent 
that the agency’s views have the “power to persuade,” some, Justice 
Scalia chief among them, would insist that it is not “deference” in the 
relevant way.249 But many judges and commentators understand 
Skidmore to involve, in some cases, a court agreeing with the agency 
without having been convinced. Professors Thomas Merrill and Kristin 
Hickman call it “an intermediate option” that “rescues courts from a 
stark choice between Chevron deference or no deference at all.”250 
 
 245.  Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
643, 652 (2015). 
 246.  See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text; Monaghan, supra note 3, at 5 (“Deference, 
to be meaningful, imports agency displacement of what might have been the judicial view res 
nova—in short, administrative displacement of judicial judgment.”). 
 247.  Monaghan, supra note 3, at 6 (“A statement that judicial deference is mandated to an 
administrative ‘interpretation’ of a statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial 
conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has been conferred upon the agency.”). 
 248.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (“Chevron did nothing to eliminate 
Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form.”). 
 249.  Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to “so-called Skidmore deference”); see Kristin 
E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1235, 1252–55 (2007) (describing the “independent judgment model of Skidmore review”).  
 250.  Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 
(2001); accord Hickman & Krueger, supra note 249, at 1241 & n.22 (2007); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559, 568–69 (2006) (describing 
Skidmore deference as a “weaker and more contingent type of deference” than that associated with 
Chevron). 
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Professor Eskridge and his collaborator call it “mildly deferential,” “a 
judicial willingness to go along.”251 Professor Strauss, who advocates 
the term “Skidmore weight,” says that under Skidmore courts retain 
their independent judgment but give weight to agency opinions because 
they are often more informed, more uniform, more predictable, more 
experienced, and generally more savvy than courts’ own.252 
Resolving this question is beyond the scope of this Article. Which 
view is right determines the ethics of interpretation in the shadow of 
Skidmore deference. If courts defer under Skidmore to agency 
interpretations they think are interpretively suboptimal, then agencies 
are saying what the law is and must promulgate the interpretation they 
think is interpretively the best. If courts will not accept interpretations 
with which they do not agree, agencies are both entitled and usually 
wise to privilege the courts’ anticipated interpretation over their own 
best interpretation of the statute. 
C. Agencies Interpreting Their Own Regulations 
Another genus of deference is that accorded to agencies when 
they resolve ambiguities in their own regulations. In the classic case of 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,253 and then again in Auer v. 
Robbins,254 the Supreme Court instructed courts to defer to agency 
interpretations of agencies’ own regulations whenever those 
interpretations are not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’’255 The Court limits such “Auer deference” to situations 
where there is no reason to suspect that the agency’s interpretation 
“does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the 
matter in question.”256 But if the agency is acting in good faith, Auer is 
to ambiguous regulations as Chevron is to ambiguous statutes,257 except 
 
 251. Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An 
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 
1737, 1744 (2010). 
 252.  Strauss, supra note 6, at 1146. 
 253.  325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 254.  519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 255.  Id. at 461. 
 256.  Id. at 462. 
 257.  See Coeur Alaska v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 277–78 (2009); John 
F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency 
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 613 (1996) (“The Chevron and Seminole Rock principles . . . are 
functionally similar.”). 
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that its “plainly erroneous” standard is even more deferential—in the 
hands of the Court, much more deferential—than Chevron’s 
reasonableness standard.258 
Three sitting justices of the Supreme Court, along with the late 
Justice Scalia, have recently indicated—some of them repeatedly—that 
they are open to overruling Auer.259 They express two primary concerns. 
The first, based upon separation of powers, is that legally binding text 
should not be promulgated and interpreted by the same agency.260 
Chevron deference respects this principle because the Congress 
legislates and the agencies interpret. But Auer does not, because 
agencies first promulgate rules and then, by the operation of deference, 
function as authoritative interpreters of those same rules.261 
A second problem is more practical. Auer encourages, rather 
than discourages, ambiguity in rulemaking. If agencies know that 
courts will defer to any interpretation of a regulation not “plainly 
erroneous,” they will draft regulations in ways that maximize 
ambiguity, in order to be able to operate in as expansive a deference 
space as possible.262 
 
 258.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 516 & n.8 (2011) (finding the Court is 
“extraordinarily deferential” to agency interpretations of their own rules, and the courts of appeals 
somewhat less so (citing Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1142 & tbl.15)). 
 259.  See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bryana Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, slip op. at 2 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 
1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 
(2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338 (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring) (Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, expressing general agreement with 
Justice Scalia’s disapproval of Auer but disagreeing that Decker was an appropriate vehicle 
through which to overrule the case). Professor Manning points out that other justices can also be 
understood to have endorsed some or all of these concerns. See Manning, supra note 257, at 615 
(discussing Justice Thomas’s dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and O’Connor, in 
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 518 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 The Congress also occasionally seeks explicitly specifically to overrule Auer. At this writing, 
the most recent attempt is H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2016) (proposing to amend the 
Administrative Procedure Act to provide that courts should “decide de novo all relevant questions 
of law, including the interpretation of . . . rules made by agencies”). Enactment is highly unlikely.  
 260.  Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Manning, 
supra note 257, at 654 (“Given the reality that agencies engage in ‘lawmaking’ when they exercise 
rulemaking authority, Seminole Rock contradicts the constitutional premise that lawmaking and 
law-exposition must be distinct.”). 
 261.  Manning, supra note 257, at 654. 
 262.   Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United 
Student Aid Funds, 136 S. Ct. 1607, slip op. at 2 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1449, 1460–62 (2010). 
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Both of these concerns are rooted in the recognition that an 
agency to whose interpretations courts defer is authoritatively 
declaring what the law means. Justice Scalia’s objections to Auer lead 
to one of the most direct acknowledgements in the United States 
Reports of Professor Monaghan’s and Professor Sunstein’s deference-
as-Marbury claim:263 
Making regulatory programs effective is the purpose of rulemaking, in which the agency 
uses its “special expertise” to formulate the best rule. But the purpose of interpretation is 
to determine the fair meaning of the rule—to “say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137 [ ] (1803). Not to make policy, but to determine what policy has been made 
and promulgated by the agency, to which the public owes obedience. 264 
Justice Scalia is clear here not only that agencies say what the law is, 
but that doing so involves a duty to interpret and “[n]ot to make 
policy.”265 
Were agencies to acknowledge a duty, when interpreting their 
own regulations, “not to make policy” but only to interpret, the concerns 
about the Auer doctrine that the Justices have expressed would be 
ameliorated, though not rectified. Agencies that scrupulously hewed to 
what they viewed as the best interpretation of an agency rule, 
regardless of their policy preferences, would have relatively little 
incentive to promulgate ambiguous rules that were purposely 
ambiguous. Even faithful purposivist interpretation would not allow 
agencies the free rein that Justice Scalia and his colleagues fear. 
This does not solve the Auer problem; the separation of powers 
claim that interpretation and promulgation must be separate remains.  
But, as even Justice Scalia recognizes, deference is a compromise.266 If 
there were a broad consensus that deference to agencies interpreting 
their own rules was not permission for agencies to act however they 
thought best, but demanded agency interpretation, that compromise 
might be more palatable. 
 
 263.  Monaghan, supra note 3, at 25. 
 264.  Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  See id. at 1341 (“Auer deference has the same beneficial pragmatic effect as Chevron 
deference: The country need not endure the uncertainty produced by divergent views of numerous 
district courts and courts of appeals as to what is the fairest reading of the regulation, until a 
definitive answer is finally provided, years later, by this Court.”); Pierce & Weiss, supra note 258, 
at 519; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 262, at 1459. 
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D. Agencies Exercising Their  
Investigative and Prosecutorial Functions 
Agencies routinely monitor the conduct of regulated entities, 
investigate alleged misconduct, and prosecute violations internally 
before agency tribunals. These activities perforce involve statutory 
interpretation. To investigate or prosecute the violation of a statute or 
regulation requires a judgment about what the statute or regulation 
means. 
Consider, then, a statute that prohibits a range of behaviors and 
authorizes the agency to enforce that prohibition; but the scope of the 
statutory prohibition is ambiguous. We have established that a 
conscientious agency is obliged to conform its deference-worthy 
rulemakings and adjudicative decisions to what it regards as the best 
interpretation of that statute. But must it similarly conform its 
monitoring, investigative, and prosecutorial functions to that same, 
best interpretation? Or, could the agency investigate and prosecute 
activity not prohibited by the statute as the agency best understands it, 
but that would be prohibited under a competing, reasonable, but 
suboptimal interpretation of the statute? An agency might want to do 
this, if it were permissible. Investigation and prosecution could deter 
conduct that the agency wants to prevent as a policy matter—
notwithstanding that, were the matter to come to a final adjudicative 
decision, the agency could not hold that it was forbidden. 
The converse case, with somewhat different implications, would 
involve an agency whose best interpretation of a statute prohibits a 
wide range of conduct, but which had a policy preference for a narrower 
interpretation that is both reasonable and, from the agency point of 
view, interpretively suboptimal. Could such an agency direct its 
investigators and prosecutors to exercise discretion and ignore conduct 
that, under what it views as the best interpretation of a statute, is 
prohibited? 
Assessing this problem demands a comparison between the 
adjudicative and rulemaking functions on the one hand, and 
monitoring, investigation, and prosecution on the other. The most 
obvious difference between the two sets of roles, of course, is that the 
latter group does not involve “final” agency action.267 Monitoring, 
investigation, and prosecution are generally not subject to judicial 
 
 267.  5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2012). 
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review at all.268 They are certainly not candidates for judicial deference, 
even of the Skidmore variety. If a final agency action that will not 
receive judicial deference need not conform to the best interpretation of 
the statute—as I have argued269—then it seems that a fortiori an agency 
need not conform its non-final activities, which receive no deference 
whatsoever, to that interpretation. 
At the same time, monitoring, investigation, and prosecution 
involve interpretive discretion much like that associated with 
rulemaking and adjudication. Moreover, these functions are part of a 
single process that culminates in adjudication. The modal (though not 
universal) practice is for a single agency simultaneously to monitor, 
investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate.270 An agency interpretation that 
leads it to investigate or prosecute some kinds of activity but not others 
has enormous consequences for the regulated public. Investigation and 
prosecution are the engines of adjudication. They determine what 
questions are heard and what interpretations are considered. And 
prosecutors themselves, in an important sense, are adjudicators; in 
particular, a case never prosecuted will never be adjudicated.271 
Investigation and prosecution are thus central parts of an agency’s law 
declaration function. 
To be sure, the Administrative Procedure Act, concerned about 
the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, imposes 
upon agencies an internal “separation of functions” that prohibits 
collusion and most communication between agency officials involved in 
the two sets of activities.272 This separation, however, is imperfect. It 
does not apply before adjudicative proceedings begin. It applies only to 
formal adjudication, with no parallel provisions for rulemaking or 
 
 268.  5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
1155, 1159 (2016) (“Agencies have always enjoyed unfettered discretion to choose their 
enforcement targets”). 
 269.  See supra Part I.C. 
 270.  See Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJ’s in Historical Perspective, 20 
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 157, 157–58 (2000). 
 271.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009). 
 272.  See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012); Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2398 (2011). This design is sometimes referred to as the “internal 
separation of powers” within agencies. It is conceptually clearer, however, to distinguish the two 
terms, treating the latter as a broader category. Stack, supra, at 2395 n.10 (citing Gillian E. 
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 
59 EMORY L.J. 423, 429–34, 453–57 (2009)). 
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informal adjudication.273 The separation of functions also breaks down, 
of necessity, when the head of an agency, by definition the supervisor of 
investigators and prosecutors in her agency’s employ, conducts 
adjudications herself.274 In that circumstance, the same individual is 
perforce involved in investigation, prosecution, and monitoring. Can 
that single individual, ethically obliged when adjudicating to conform 
to what she determines to be the best interpretation of the statute, 
simultaneously direct prosecutors and investigators to hew to a 
different, though still reasonable, interpretation? 
The matter is further complicated by the nature and processes 
of investigation and prosecution, which are focused on the development 
of factual records and, in their nature, are often adversarial. An agency 
might arrive at its view of a best interpretation because its opinions are 
sharpened by an adversarial, intra-agency prosecution; indeed, it might 
come to change its view of what is the best interpretation because of 
such a prosecution. To require investigators and prosecutors to hew to 
the existing agency interpretation might be to ossify agency 
interpretation and prevent access to facts and opinions that should 
inform it. 
An important additional set of concerns is raised by the ethical 
duty of prosecutors, in particular, to “seek justice.”275 There are strong 
reasons to think that intra-agency prosecutors, just as criminal 
prosecutors, bear such duties. Professor Bruce Green has been the 
preeminent proponent of the claim that civil lawyers representing the 
government—a somewhat broader category than agency litigators—
must seek justice.276 Green understands this to be a consequence of 
their “dual role as lawyer for the government and government 
official.”277 Supporting Green’s normative claims is the practical reality 
 
 273.  See Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 760 (1981). Asimow notes that some agencies 
separate functions even when such separation is not statutorily required. See id. 
 274.  See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(C); Asimow, supra note 273, at 765–68. This rule is the same for 
agencies headed by single persons and by bodies of several commissioners.  
 275.  See supra notes 57–65 and accompanying text. 
 276.  Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 239 (2000). 
 277.  Id. at 265–66. But see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics 
of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 1013–17 
(1991) (stating civil government lawyers have no special justice-seeking duties beyond those that 
apply to all attorneys). It should be noted that the line between criminal and civil proceedings is 
permeable. To be sure, agency prosecutions rarely involve criminal penalties, but when they do, 
these cases require the involvement of non-agency prosecutors, who bear independent duties to 
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that agency prosecutors, like their criminal counterparts, wield 
unusually vast powers as representatives of the sovereign.278 Both sorts 
of prosecutors also adopt an adversarial posture with respect to their 
opposing parties;279 both enjoy very substantial discretion; and both can 
use that discretion to disrupt, upend, and even destroy lives and 
livelihoods.280 
These considerations push one to want agency prosecutors, like 
their criminal counterparts, to seek justice. But if justice-seeking is a 
duty that agency prosecutors bear, in some circumstances it will come 
into conflict with the view that agency prosecution must hew to the best 
interpretation of a statute. The best reading from an interpretive 
perspective might not be the reading that best advances justice. 
One easy solution to this conflict is to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion, but to do so only within the constraints of the agency’s best 
interpretation. So, in the case where an agency thinks the statute, 
assigned its best reading, prohibits a range of behaviors, it would be 
entirely legitimate to direct investigators and prosecutors to give 
attention only to a subset of those behaviors. This is garden-variety 
investigative and prosecutorial discretion. It need not be conceptualized 
as giving the statute a suboptimal reading at all. An agency might have 
a range of motives for proceeding in this way, including justice-seeking. 
Discretion can of course be abused, and at the margins there will be 
gray areas.281 
 
seek justice, and eventual determination by a court. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and 
Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2005) (noting that the 
“modern federal regulatory state [is] founded on civil penalties, punitive damages, and delegations 
of prosecutorial authority to administrative agencies and private parties”); Laura J. Kerrigan et 
al., Project: The Decriminalization of Administrative Law Penalties, Civil Remedies, Alternatives, 
Policy, and Constitutional Implications, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 369, 419, 426 & nn.473–80 (1993) 
(documenting trend away from criminal sanctions for regulatory offenses, but noting the 
“commingling of administrative and criminal law power” in agency Offices of Inspector General 
and giving examples of “federal legislation authorizing parallel administrative and criminal 
proceedings”). Agency and criminal prosecutors also cooperate and, even absent active cooperation, 
assist one another in developing facts and evidence. See generally Shiv Narayan Persaud, Parallel 
Investigations Between Administrative and Law Enforcement Agencies: A Question of Civil 
Liberties, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77 (2013). 
 278.  Green, supra note 58, at 632–33. 
 279.  Zacharias, supra note 64, at 53 (suggesting a connection between this adversarial posture 
and prosecutors’ duty to seek justice). 
 280.  See KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 520–21 (4th 
ed. 2004). 
 281.  See, e.g., United States v. Texas 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.); Texas v. United States, 
809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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This does not resolve, however, the difficult question: If an 
agency preference conflicts with what it understands to be the best 
interpretation of a statute, may it direct its prosecutors and 
investigators to pursue suboptimal, but still reasonable, interpretations 
for policy reasons? With respect to prosecutors, must the agency do so if 
it believes those interpretively suboptimal readings to be justice-
seeking? It would, of course, then be obligated to impose the 
interpretively optimal reading were it required to make an adjudicative 
decision that would induce judicial deference. But this outcome is not a 
certainty: many cases never get that far. 
Ultimately, in such circumstances, an agency must investigate 
and prosecute only in ways consistent with its best interpretation of the 
statute. In the context of adjudication and rulemaking, this duty is 
triggered by judicial deference, which gives the agency discretion that, 
within a range of reasonableness, is not subject to further review. When 
they investigate and prosecute, agencies exercise discretion that is 
similarly unreviewable. This duty, therefore, should apply even in 
circumstances where the ultimate agency decision is reviewable and 
does not receive deference—because investigative and prosecutorial 
discretion is not itself reviewable. It should also apply to cases unlikely 
to be resolved through final agency action of any kind. Although it is 
true that investigations and prosecutions might generate change in 
agencies’ opinions about what the best interpretation is, once such an 
interpretation is determined, change must come through a process of 
intra-agency consultation and argument, not through adversarial 
proceedings. 
This view is consistent with Green’s suggestion that the duty of 
the civil government lawyer to seek justice is a manifestation of her 
“constitutional duty to faithfully carry out the law” and to avoid 
“seeking outcomes or employing methods that, in the lawyer’s 
independent professional judgment, are contrary to the law.”282 Unlike 
criminal prosecutors, who are separately elected or selected with an 
independent mandate to seek justice, agencies—including prosecutors 
within those agencies—are creatures of their statutes. When they 
exercise discretionary functions not subject to outside review, they 
should do so only in ways consistent with their best understanding of 
what the law requires. Policy preferences, and any justice-seeking duty 
borne by agency prosecutors, must be subordinate to agency duty to 
interpret the statute as best it can. Agency prosecutors may collaborate 
 
 282.  Green, supra note 276, at 276. 
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with outside prosecutors, who have their own, different duties; but their 
own responsibility to the statute is paramount. 
E. Interpretation and the Law Governing Lawyers 
The ethical obligations of a lawyer who works for an agency are 
the subject of a small but interesting literature. The most persuasive 
position in that literature is that such a lawyer represents her own 
particular agency, not the government writ large or the public in 
general. As Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller explain: 
[T]he scope of a government attorney’s ethical duties must be understood in the context 
of the attorney’s role in a system of separation of powers. It is not the responsibility of an 
agency attorney to represent the “public interest” nor the government as a whole. Rather, 
the constitutional system of checks and balances depends upon the institutional loyalty 
of its attorneys. Although this argument runs counter to the common intuition that the 
government attorney should act to further the common good, we argue that this common 
view is ultimately insupportable, in large part because there is simply no consensus in 
our pluralistic society as to what constitutes the common good.283 
An agency lawyer owes her agency duties to provide sound advice and 
zealous representation when requested, although she may not assist it 
in clearly unlawful activity. 
There is no reason to alter this conclusion in the context of 
statutory interpretation. So, to take an example offered by Miller, an 
agency lawyer should not assist her agency in promulgating a rule or 
adjudication that interprets a statute in a manner contrary to that 
announced in a court decision in which the agency was a party.284 (Even 
then, she should first work within the agency to forestall such 
 
 283.  Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a 
Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1995); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97(2) cmt. c (2000); Green, supra note 58, at 636–37, 627 n.84 
(“Lawyers representing the government in civil proceedings typically (although perhaps wrongly) 
view the agencies they represent as their client for purposes of allocating decision-making. As a 
result, they have a tendency to view their ethical responsibilities as essentially the same as those 
held by lawyers for private clients. This view finds support in the professional literature.”); Miller, 
supra note 54, at 1296 (“In a system of checks and balances it is not the responsibility of an agency 
attorney to represent the interests of Congress or the Court . . . . [T]he constitutional system 
presumes—indeed, depends upon—the institutional loyalty of its [agency] lawyers [to their 
agencies].”); Rosenthal, supra note 209, at 17 (rejecting the view that “the role of the lawyer is to 
interpret the statute and provide legal advice that best fulfills the public interest as expressed in 
such statute,” arguing that it is “implausible to characterize the enabling statute as the expression 
of some collective, universally agreed-upon public interest”). But see Note, supra note 54, at 1185–
90 (rejecting an “agency loyalty approach to government lawyering” in favor of a “critical 
approach”). 
 284.  Miller, supra note 54, at 1297. 
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behavior.285) But she not only may but should assist an agency in 
promulgating (and then litigating) actions based on an interpretation 
that she, in the exercise of her professional judgment, thinks are 
mistaken and/or expects eventually to be overturned, but which the 
well-advised agency nevertheless has the institutional prerogative to 
issue.286 
A different question arises about agencies themselves. Given 
that an agency is the person or body of persons who have the authority 
to commit the government of the United States,287 it is possible that the 
ethical duties of those persons may depend on their professional status. 
Nothing requires that an agency be a lawyer; often they are not.288 But 
sometimes they are. Does an agency that is also a lawyer bear different 
ethical responsibilities with respect to statutory interpretation? 
The answer is no. It is impossible to see how an agency who is a 
lawyer would have a more stringent obligation than a non-lawyer 
agency. The latter already has the obligation to say what the law is 
according to her best, public-minded judgment. This should apply 
regardless of professional status. Similarly, a federal judge who is not 
herself a lawyer has the same duties as her attorney colleagues with 
respect to saying what the law is.289 
It is only slightly more challenging to reject the converse 
possibility, that agencies who are attorneys should have the duties I 
describe here, but that non-lawyer agencies should be entitled to more 
freedom of action. In the context of stare decisis, for example, Professors 
Nestor Davidson and Ethan Leib assert that “it would be reasonable to 
ask whether nonlawyers who do not usually reason by case and 
precedent do or should feel themselves bound by prior institutional 
decisions.”290 While the question may be reasonable with respect to a 
transsubstantive issue like stare decisis, there is no reason 
systematically to allow non-lawyer agencies more latitude with respect 
to substantive legal interpretation than agencies who are lawyers. The 
obligation to interpret the law flows from the role of the interpreter in 
the governmental scheme, not her professional status. 
 
 285.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, §§ 96(2–3), 97(2) (2000). 
 286.  Miller, supra note 54, at 1294, 1296–97. 
 287.  See supra Part I.A. 
 288.  See Rosenthal, supra note 209, at 18. 
 289.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 2.2 (“A judge shall uphold and apply the law.”). 
 290.  Davidson & Leib, supra note 15, at 273. 
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CONCLUSION: REJECTING CYNICISM IN AGENCY PRACTICE 
Any reader who has persevered this far might well wonder 
whether so many pages are justified to argue for a principle that cannot 
be policed or, in many cases, even observed. Well and good, my reader 
might agree: The fact of judicial deference indeed does not invite 
agencies to choose any interpretation that will merit such deference. By 
making the agency the final authoritative interpreter, deference indeed 
heightens the duty agencies bear to interpret statutes as best they can. 
But nevertheless, in the real world, deference absolutely does invite 
agencies to pick whatever interpretation, from among those that will 
survive judicial review, that they like the best. By doing so, they get 
what they want. Who would reject such an invitation—especially when 
any gap that might exist between their stated preference and their 
genuine view of the best interpretation will be invisible to all? To 
imagine that agencies might feel themselves bound not to have what 
they want betrays a hopeless romantic, and unrealistic, view of agency 
practice.291 
I do not deny that the entire argument I have presented is 
predicated upon agencies being honest, at least with themselves if not 
with the public, regarding what they think the “best” interpretation is. 
Especially when choosing from among reasonable interpretations, it is 
trivially easy to disguise such an opinion. One can allow one’s statutory 
judgment to be clouded by policy judgment, obfuscate, or just plain 
conceal one’s own real opinion about the best result. 
Nevertheless: We do not and should not assume that those 
authorized to say what the law is in the United States are dishonest or 
even that they are obfuscatory. We should not even assume that they 
allow themselves routinely to fall prey to self-deception. All of these 
things are sometimes true, but they are not generally true. Exhibit A is 
the judiciary. For all the evidence that judges are sometimes swayed by 
policy, for all the suspicions that in this or that case a judicial opinion 
describes reasons different from the true motivation for the result, for 
all of the literature that suggests that courts deploy doctrines (like 
Chevron) inconsistently, strategically, even arbitrarily—our legal 
system operates in genuine faith that judges are impartial and 
committed to the rule of law. We know that departures from this norm 
are hard to detect, but we are not lying to ourselves when we doubt that 
they are the norm. This may be romantic, but it is hardly unrealistic. 
 
 291.  See Leib & Galoob, supra note 47, at 1820 & n.209. 
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The project of this Article is to bring agencies entitled to judicial 
deference under this umbrella. They, no less than courts, say what the 
law is every day. They therefore, like courts, bear duties to interpret the 
law as best they can. The courts and the public are entitled to expect, 
and to behave as if, agencies can, will, and do rise to their 
responsibilities. 
